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Judicial Removal of Directors: Denial of
Directors' License to Steal or
Shareholders' Freedom to Vote?
by
OLGA N. SIRODOEVA-PAXSON*
"If I only could, I surely would."' This is the answer that appears
to be put into shareholders' mouths by a growing number of state
corporate statutes. The question is: "Would you remove directors for
misconduct?" In recent years, twenty-nine states2 (two of them since
19973) have adopted provisions empowering courts to remove
directors elected by shareholders, apparently under the assumption
that shareholders sometimes would like to, but cannot, remove
directors themselves. This new removal power granted to courts is
extraordinary in that it usurps the inherent voting rights of
shareholders.4
* Moscow State University (Ph.D., 1995), University of Virginia (LL.M., 1993),
Moscow State University (J.D., 1992). Associate, Coudert Brothers, New York. I wish to
thank my husband, Edwin W. Paxson III, for his moral support as I was writing this article
and for his helpful comments to its drafts. I thank Professor Bernard Black, Professor
Michael Dooley, Professor Paul Stephan, Cory Kirchert, Catherine Rogers, Clyde E.
Rankin III, and John F. Sheedy for their valuable comments to earlier drafts of this article.
I also thank Professor William Burnham, Professor Jeffrey Gordon, Professor Robert
Hamilton, Professor James Liebman, Professor Saul Levmore, and Roswell B. Perkins for
their insights on the topic.
1. For a melodic rendering of this phrase, see SIMON AND GARFUNKEL, El Condor
Pasa (If I Could), on BRIDGE OVER TROUBLED WATER (Columbia Records 1970).
2. See MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. § 8.09 Statutes (Supp. 1997); IDAHO CODE §
30-1-809 (Supp. 1998); NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2086 (1997); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-
41.1 (Supp. 1997).
3. See IDAHO CODE § 30-1-809 (Supp. 1998); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-41.1 (Supp.
1997).
4. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 216 (1991). Courts also view shareholders'
rights to elect and remove directors as inherent. See, e.g., Ross Sys. Corp. v. Ross, No.
CIV.A.10378, 1993 WL 49778, at *17-18 (Del. Ch. Feb. 22, 1993) (stating that only
shareholders--not courts--are empowered to remove a director); see also Joe G. Davis,
Jr., Corporations-Stockholders' Right to Remove Directors, 7 BAYLOR L. REv. 313
(1955) (describing many other authorities for the courts' recognition of shareholders'
inherent powers to elect and remove directors); infra notes 22-26 and accompanying text.
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The discord among various authorities concerning the judicial
removal of directors is remarkable. The Model Business Corporation
Act (the "Model Act") establishes a judicial right of removal,5 while
the American Law Institute Principles of Corporate Governance (the
"ALI Principles") do not contemplate such a remedy.6 The three
leading states in the field of corporate law also prescribe different
rules: New York authorizes courts to remove both directors and
officers,7 California provides for judicial removal of directors only,8
and Delaware does not contemplate the judicial removal of either
directors or officers. 9
Nor have the courts agreed on when or how to invoke their
removal powers. The standards in decided cases are deficient and the
outcomes inconsistent. At one extreme, the court removes directors
without regard for the possibility that shareholders might legitimately
disagree with the court's perception of their preferences.' 0 In so
ignoring shareholder prerogative, the court disenfranchises
shareholders supposedly in order to protect them and their
corporation." At the other extreme, the court ratifies a decision of
5. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. § 8.09 (Supp. 1997). The Model Business
Corporation Act is approved by the Committee on Corporate Laws of the Section of
Corporation, Banking and Business Law of the American Bar Association. It is designed
to be a guide for the revision of state business corporation laws. In its various editions
published over the past 50 years, it has been followed by most states and has influenced
the development of corporate law in almost all states. The judicial removal remedy was
introduced in the 1984 revision of the Model Act.
6. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE:
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (1994) [hereinafter ALl PRINCIPLES]. The ALI
Principles represent a fundamental effort by the American Law Institute to harmonize and
determine new directions for corporate governance. Even though the entire second
volume of this two-volume work is devoted to corporate law remedies, the ALI Principles
do not endorse the removal remedy.
7. See N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §§ 706,716 (McKinney 1986 & Supp. 1998).
8. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 304 (West 1990).
9. See generally DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 (1991 & Supp. 1996); see also Ross Sys. Corp.
v. Ross, No. CIV.A.10378, 1993 WL 49778, at *17-18 (Del. Ch. Feb. 22, 1993). For a
description of Ross, see infra notes 23-26 and accompanying text.
10. See, e.g., Koshaba v. Koshaba, 132 P.2d 854 (Cal. Ct. App. 1942). For a description
of Koshaba, see infra note 294 and accompanying text.
11. This oxymoron is borrowed from Jayne W. Barnard, The Securities Law
Enforcement Remedies Act of 1989: Disenfranchising Shareholders in Order to Protect
Them, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 32 (1989). Professor Barnard's article was devoted to the
Securities and Exchange Commission's removal powers. The oxymoron is even more
fitting for the judicial removal remedy in the pure corporate law context discussed in this
article. The removal remedy under the securities laws disenfranchises the shareholders of
a particular corporation in order to protect shareholders in the market generally. In
contrast, the removal remedy under corporate statutes attempts to protect those same
shareholders (and their corporation) whom it disenfranchises.
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shareholder-directors who are guilty of wrongdoing to reelect
themselves as directors.12
Three recent court decisions highlight the discrepancy in
approach and confusion surrounding the removal remedy. In
Delaware, the Chancery Court held that absent statutory
authorization it lacked power to remove a director, while stating that
it would have had the authority to appoint a receiver and effectively
remove the entire board had the plaintiff requested such an action.13
In New York, the Southern District Court refused to remove a
director for self-dealing, reasoning that the statute did not grant the
corporation the right to bring a removal action to protect itself. The
New York court nevertheless found that the attorney general would
have standing to bring such an action for the benefit of the
corporation.14 Lastly, in Massachusetts, the Superior Court removed
a director even though it recognized his accomplishments as a
manager.15
Despite the radical divergence in approach among legislatures
and courts, no theory reconciling the conflicting positions with respect
to the judicial removal remedy has yet been proposed. 16 The goal of
this article is not only to explore the merits and perils of the judicial
12. See Remillard Brick Co. v. Remillard-Dandini Co., 241 P.2d 66, 73-77 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1952). For a description of Remillard Brick, see infra notes 138-42 and
accompanying text.
13. See Ross, 1993 WL 49778, at *17-18. For a description of Ross, see infra notes 23-
26 and accompanying text.
14. See Management Techs., Inc. v. Morris, 961 F. Supp. 640, 650-52 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
For a description of Management Technologies, see infra notes 257-59 and accompanying
text.
15. See Demoulas v. Demoulas, No. CIV.A.90-2344, 1996 WL 511519, at *7 (Mass.
Super. Ct. Oct. 1, 1996). For a description of Demoulas, see infra note 79.
16. Several drafters of the Model Act I interviewed confirmed that no analysis of the
removal remedy was made when it was included in the Model Act. In contrast, Roswell
B. Perkins, who was the President of the American Law Institute at the time the ALI
Principles were prepared and adopted, responded that in his view, the judicial removal of
directors would have been a contentious issue had it been proposed for inclusion in the
ALI Principles. Interestingly, while one of the drafters of the Model Act was supportive
of the remedy, another took a dissenting position with respect to the judicial removal
provision in the Model Act and said that it should not have been there. However, it is
there and is being widely followed by the states. In addition, the effects of this provision
extend even beyond the confines of corporate law. For example, in the debates on
granting the Securities and Exchange Commission rights to require removal of directors
and officers and barring them from occupying similar positions, the existence of the
removal remedy in the corporate context was mentioned as a given, and parity with
shareholders' rights was suggested as an argument for giving similar rights to the SEC. See
Barnard, supra note 11, at 51. These rights were later conferred upon the SEC in the
Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990. Pub. L. No. 101-
429, 104 Stat. 931 (1990) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77t(e), 78u(d)(2) (1994)); see also infra
note 102.
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removal of directors, but also to resolve the conflict between the
competing goals of corporate law reflected in the removal remedy,
and from that theoretical basis to develop a workable test to be
introduced by the courts or codified in the removal statutes.
Part I describes the history and nature of the judicial removal
remedy. Part II offers a theory for the removal remedy. I identify
three fundamental interests implicated by the removal remedy:
interests of shareholder democracy, interests of the corporation, and
those of the marketplace. There is often tension among these
interests. The first fundamental interest, that of shareholder
democracy, encompasses the shareholders' inherent right to elect and
remove directors. If it were the only interest at stake, it would
unconditionally prohibit judicial removal. However, the second
interest, that of the corporation, invites judicial removal of
misbehaving directors in disregard of shareholder prerogative where
the removal would protect the corporation from continuing
directorial wrongdoing. In order to reconcile these two fundamental
interests, I introduce the concept of "impairment" to shareholder
vote and define two situations in which judicial removal may be
justified. In the first situation, a shareholder who controls voting halts
removal because his interest does not coincide with that of the
corporation ("divergence of interests impairment" to the removal of
directors by shareholders). In the second situation, shareholders are
unable to remove directors due to impediments of a procedural,
rather than substantive, nature ("procedural impairment"). The third
interest that must be evaluated is that of the market. This interest is
aimed at deterring directorial wrongdoing in general, and may call for
the removal of directors in disregard of both inherent shareholder
rights and the interests of a particular corporation. After examining a
formula of efficient deterrence, I conclude that a removal remedy
designed to address a director's wrongdoing against a corporation is
an inefficient deterrent and therefore should not be modified to harm
the corporation in pursuit of deterrence.
Part III proposes an allocation of responsibilities to apply the
removal remedy. Starting from the premise that the interests of the
corporation are the proper goal of the removal remedy, I consider
whether the removal power should be granted to the board of
directors rather than to the court. I conclude that the power should
rest with the court due to its unique ability to evaluate the severity of
misbehavior and to preserve the existing balance of powers within the
corporation. The board (acting through its disinterested members)
should nevertheless enjoy a veto right with respect to the application
of the removal remedy if it determines that removal would be
contrary to the corporation's best interests. I argue further that an
unusual rule allowing a shareholder holding an arbitrary percentage
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of shares to bring a removal suit as a direct, rather than derivative,
action deprives the board of its usual powers and should be
eliminated.
Part IV proposes a test to be codified in the removal statutes or
introduced directly by courts. I begin by identifying the inadequacies
of existing tests and argue that an appropriate test must find a proper
balance between the objective of protecting the interests of the
corporation and the prerogatives of its shareholders. At the outset, I
recommend that the right the board enjoys in a derivative action to
halt lawsuits not in the corporation's best interests should also be
available in a removal action. If the removal lawsuit is not halted by
board action, the proposed test proceeds with a three-prong analysis.
First, the court should make a finding of gross misbehavior. Second,
the court should determine that removal would be in the best
interests of the corporation (or adhere to the board's determination,
if available and not wrongful). Finally, the court must find a
"divergence of interests impairment" or "procedural impairment" to
the exercise of the shareholders' voting rights. The test also stipulates
how the finding of a particular type of impairment affects the manner
in which the impairment could be cured and the scope of the remedy.
I. History and Description of the Removal Remedy
A. History of the Judicial Removal of Directors
As corporate law has evolved during this century, the process of
removing directors from their positions has been simplified. This
tendency began with a liberalization of standards for removal of
directors by shareholders, and was later fortified by the development
of judicial removal rules. Under the common law, directors had an
entitlement to their position and could be removed by shareholders
only for cause.17 Today, most statutes grant shareholders the right to
remove directors with or without cause.18 Shareholders can require
that a special shareholder meeting be called for this purpose.'9
17. See MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. § 8.08 official cmt. (Supp. 1997). For a
description of the history of the change from the removal "for cause" to the removal "with
or without cause," see Gerschel v. Town and Country Management Corp., No. CIV.A.
6843, 1982 WL 17878, at *4 (Del. Ch. July 1, 1982), and Timothy F. Scanlon,
Corporations-Directors- Validity of By-Law Permitting Removal of Directors Without
Cause, 59 MICH. L. REV. 640 (1961). For an extensive theoretical discussion on the issue,
see Arthur H. Travers, Jr., Removal of the Corporate Director During His Term of Office,
53 IowA L. REv. 389 (1967).
18. See, e.g., MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. § 8.08 (Supp. 1997); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
8, § 141(k) (1991). Some states make this rule imperative. See, e.g., id. Usually, however,
the right to remove without cause can be waived in the articles of incorporation of a
company. See MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. § 8.08(a) (Supp. 1997). Some state statutes
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Although removing directors has become progressively easier,
shareholders do not always remove even directors who engage in
gross misconduct. There is no judicial consensus on whether courts
have equitable power to remove directors in such circumstances
absent statutory authorization. This may be surprising given that in
the area of corporate law courts generally have a reputation for being
anything but shy.20 Some courts have lived up to this reputation by
holding that because directors hold a position of trust, judicial power
to remove them exists independently of statute.21 Nevertheless, most
courts have exhibited remarkable modesty by stating that they have
contain a different default rule: removal without cause is permitted only if the articles of
incorporation so provide. See, e.g., N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 706(6)(b) (McKinney 1986).
Statutes give special consideration to the removal of directors elected by cumulative
voting or via a voting group in order to protect the rights of minority shareholders and
preserve the balance of powers within the corporation. If a director is elected by a voting
group of shareholders, only the shareholders of that voting group may participate in the
vote to remove him. If cumulative voting is authorized, a director may not be removed if
the number of votes sufficient to elect him under cumulative voting is voted against his
removal. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACt ANN. § 8.08(b-c) (Supp. 1997); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 8, § 141(k)(i). For a discussion of the rationale underlying special removal provisions
in the context of cumulative voting, see John W. Hupp, Corporations- Officers and
Directors-Relationship Between Cumulative Voting and Removal Provisions, 51 MICH. L
REV. 744 (1953); Harlowe E. Bowes and Ledlie A. De Bow, Cumulative Voting at
Elections of Directors of Corporations, 21 MINN. L. REV. 351, 366-67 (1937); Note,
Cumulative Voting-Removal, Reduction and Classification of Corporate Boards, 22 U.
Cm. L. REV. 751 (1955). For a definition of voting groups and cumulative voting, see
infra notes 104-05.
19. Ownership of 10% of the shares is usually required to call such a meeting. See
MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. § 7.02(a)(2) (Supp. 1997). For a comparison of this 10%
threshold with the 10% threshold for removal actions, see infra note 247.
20. See John C. Coffee, fr., The Mandatory/Enabling Balance in Corporate Law: An
Essay on the Judicial Role, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1618, 1621-22 (1989).
[W]hat is most mandatory in corporate law is not the specific substantive content
of any rule, but rather the institution of judicial oversight. Judicial activism is the
necessary complement to contractual freedom .... In drafting the corporate
contract, lawyers rely less on the model form provided by the legislature than on
their expectation that courts will prevent either side from taking "opportunistic"
advantage of the other.
Id. at 1621. Professor Coffee also refers to the former SEC Chairman Ray Garrett as one
of the authorities for a similar approach: "In more modem terms, Garrett can be seen as
defending the proposition that the courts' ex post monitoring role is a substitute for a fully
complete contract which provides for all possible contingencies." Id. at 1622; see also Ray
Garrett, Jr., The Limited Role of Corporation Statutes, in COMMENTARIES ON
CORPORATE STRUCTURE AND GOVERNANCE: THE ALI-ABA SYMPOSIUMS 1977-1979
95,101-02 (Donald E. Schwartz ed., 1979).
21. See, e.g., Brown v. North Ventura Rd. Dev. Co., 30 Cal. Rptr. 568, 571 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1963); De Garmo v. Goldman, 123 P.2d 1, 4 (Cal. 1942). Such reasoning is based on
an analogy between corporate directors and trustees, since courts traditionally had
equitable powers to remove trustees for fraud. For the underpinnings of such an analogy,
see infra note 295 and accompanying text.
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no power to remove directors absent statutory authorization (while
sometimes, however, carving out exceptions for fraud)2 2
For example, such judicial reticence was apparent in a recent
Delaware case, Ross Systems Corporation v. Ross.23 This case tells
the story of the professional and personal failure of a famous
periodontist, Dr. Ross, who invented a dental implant. Dr. Ross
knowingly used the scanning electron microscopy photographs of the
dental implant system of his competitors, instead of his own, as a basis
for a scientific article advertising his invention. Dr. Ross became one
of the shareholders and a director of the corporation created to
implement his invention.24 After the design failure of the implant
invented by Dr. Ross became apparent and Dr. Ross' use of
photographs of his competitors' implants turned into a scandal, a
dispute arose between the shareholders. The court found that, in
addition to the fraudulent use of the falsified photographs, Dr. Ross
misappropriated various surgical tools and other equipment of the
company valued at $51,227.30 and took without payment implants
and related materials valued at another $59,570.17.25 Dr. Ross could
not be removed through the usual shareholder voting procedures
because he owned 50% of voting shares in the corporation and
effectively had a veto right with respect to his own removal.
Nevertheless, the court refused to remove Dr. Ross as a director on
the basis that the court lacked the power to remove a director even in
the event of fraud.26
22. See, e.g., Webber v. Webber Oil Co., 495 A.2d 1215, 1221 (Me. 1985) (holding that
the court has the power to remove a director only as expressly provided in the statute);
Feldman v. Pennroad Corp., 60 F. Supp. 716, 719 (D. Del. 1945), affd, 155 F.2d 773 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 808 (1946) (holding that in the absence of fraud a court has no
inherent equitable power to remove a director); Harkey v. Mobley, 552 S.W.2d 79, 81
(Mo. App. 1977) (holding that absent express statutory authority or allegations of fraud,
courts of equity have no general jurisdiction to remove directors or officers of a private
corporation; that power rests in the corporation itself).
23. No. CIV.A. 10378,1993 WL 49778 (Del. Ch. Feb. 22,1993).
24. See id. at 5. Dr. Ross and Mr. Sang, an attorney, each held 50% of voting stock of
the company. Several other shareholders held non-voting stock. Dr. Ross and Mr. Sang
were the directors of the company. Mr. Sang was also the company's president and chief
executive officer. See id.
25. See id. at 14-17. While the court found that the use of the falsified photographs did
not constitute actionable fraud against the company (but constituted instead actionable
fraud against Mr. Sang), it found that Dr. Ross committed conversion of the corporation's
property. Under applicable law, conversion was defined as "an unauthorized act that
deprives another of his identifiable property permanently or for an indefinite time."
26. See id. at 17-18.
The plaintiffs argue that because Dr. Ross defrauded the company, he is no
longer fit to serve as a director, and that since Mr. Sang and Dr. Ross each
control 50% of the company's voting stock, only a judicial decree will accomplish
Dr. Ross' removal.... This claim is without merit. The only persons empowered
November 1998]
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Historically, only a few state legislatures have responded to the
courts' reluctance to use the removal remedy by granting courts
express removal powers.27 Only after the Model Act introduced the
removal remedy for the first time in 198428 was the remedy
recognized nationwide and adopted by a majority of the states.2 9
Interestingly, while the judicial removal of directors is consistent
with the tendency to simplify the process of removing directors, this
tendency itself, together with judicial removal rules, is contrary to the
more general tendency toward liberalization 30 in corporate law. This
latter tendency has developed due to competition among the states
led by Delaware and is characterized by enabling provisions
minimizing the intrusion of legislatures and courts into corporate
matters and, as some argue, by a pro-management, rather than pro-
shareholder, bias.31  In light of this tendency, it is logical that
to remove a director are the corporation's shareholders.... [The appointment of
a receiver for a solvent corporation] would have the incidental effect of
displacing the entire board of directors. But the plaintiffs here do not ask the
Court to appoint a receiver or trustee, and they are unable to point to any statute
or other source of law that would empower this Court to remove a particular
member of the corporation's board of directors. The Court lacks the power to
grant the relief being requested.
Id. While this decision did not result in an injustice because, for unrelated reasons, the
court ordered Dr. Ross to "buy out" Mr. Sang as a shareholder of the company, it
nevertheless established an unfortunate precedent.
27. Variations of the removal remedy have existed for some time in a handful of state
corporate statutes. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 304 (West 1990) (originally enacted in
Stats. 1947, c. 1038, p. 2320, § 811); 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1726 (West 1995)
(originally enacted in Act of May 5,1933, P.L. 364, No. 106, § 405).
28. REv. MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr § 8.09 (1985).
29. Twenty-nine states have adopted judicial removal of directors provisions:
Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Idaho, Illinois,
Iowa, Maine, Michigan, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New York,
North Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina,
Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. See MODEL Bus.
CORP. Acr ANN. § 8.09 Statutes (Supp. 1997); IDAHO CODE § 30-1-809 (Supp. 1998);
NEB. REv. STAT. § 21-2086 (1997); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-41.1 (Supp. 1997). The
removal remedy also exists in some other countries. For example, for a brief description
of the removal remedy in Japan, see Mark D. West, The Pricing of Shareholder Derivative
Actions in Japan and the United States, 88 Nw. U. L. REv. 1436,1472 (1994).
30. In the context of corporate law, the term "liberalization" implies an enabling, non-
regulatory approach. The provisions on judicial removal of directors are generally
mandatory. Theoretically, however, judicial removal could instead be merely the default
rule, in keeping with the liberalization trend. The most plausible justification for the
mandatory nature of the rule is that judicial removal is a remedy for egregious
misbehavior usually involving fraud, and the courts generally do not allow the parties to
"opt out of" the duty of loyalty or the rules regarding good faith.
31. The tendency of liberalization results from competition among the states aimed at
attracting the business of incorporation to their states in order to increase tax revenues.
See, e.g., CHARLES R. O'KELLY, JR., AND ROBERT B. THOMPSON, CORPORATIONS AND
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Delaware is not following the judicial removal trend. In light of the
similarity in approach to corporate law shared by the Model Act and
Delaware, 32 it is less obvious why the Model Act introduced such a
remedy.
B. Snapshot of the Removal Remedy
Removal statutes are laconic. With varying degrees of
faithfulness, most states follow the essential features of Section 8.09
of the Model Act, which is therefore the starting point for the analysis
in this article. Section 8.09 of the Model Act provides:
(a) The [name or describe] court of the county where a
corporation's principal office (or, if none in this state, its registered
office) is located may remove a director of the corporation from
office in a proceeding commenced either by the corporation 33 or by
its shareholders holding at least 10 percent34 of the outstanding
OTHER BusINEss ORGANIZATIONS 154 (1992). This tendency has been perceived from
different standpoints at different times in legal academia and is debated to this day. In the
1950's, one of the drafters of the Model Act made the following accusation against
Delaware: "The Delaware statute bids for the corporate business of promoters. It makes
little or no effort to protect the rights of investors." Whitney Campbell, The Model
Business Corporation Act, Bus. LAW., July 1956, at 98, 100-01. In the 1970's, Professor
Cary made a famous suggestion to adopt federal standards with respect to corporate law in
order to "cure the Delaware syndrome." William Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law:
Reflections upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 701 (1974). However, at the end of the
twentieth century, some argue that state competition is a positive development. See, e.g.,
ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW (1993).
32. See Michael P. Dooley, Two Models of Corporate Governance, 47 Bus. LAW. 461,
463 (1992); LARRY D. SODERQUIST & A.A. SOMMER, JR., UNDERSTANDING
CORPORATION LAW 69-70 (1990).
33. Not all removal statutes permit the corporation to bring a suit itself. See, e.g., N.Y.
Bus. CORP. LAW § 706(d) (McKinney 1986); see also Purdy v. Humphry, 82 N.Y.S.2d 92
(Sup. Ct. 1947), affd, 82 N.Y.S.2d 388 (N.Y. App. Div. 1948); Management Techs., Inc. v.
Morris, 961 F. Supp. 640, 650 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). When a corporation has a right to bring a
suit, suits are generally brought on its behalf by its board of directors or an authorized
officer. The right to bring a suit on behalf of the corporation stems from the general
authority of the board of directors and officers to act on behalf of the corporation. See,
e.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §§ 701, 715 (McKinney 1986). The Maine corporate statute
contains a special requirement that a removal action could be brought only by the
corporation itself, upon a decision of at least two-thirds of its directors. See ME. REv.
STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A, § 707(6) (West 1981). Also, a shareholder has a general right to
bring a suit on behalf of the corporation. Such action would be considered a "derivative"
action. See MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. § 8.09 official cmt. (Supp. 1997).
34. Most jurisdictions that have adopted removal statutes have the same ten percent
requirement See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-743(a) (West 1997), N.Y. Bus.
CORP. LAW § 706(d) (McKinney 1986). However, there are deviations from the 10%
threshold in some states. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-8-109(a) (Law. Co-op. 1977) (5%
threshold); IOWA CODE ANN. § 490.809(1) (West 1991) (20% threshold). Any
shareholder may bring a removal action on behalf of the corporation. See, e.g., N.Y. Bus.
CORP. LAW § 626; see also MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. § 8.09 official cmt. (Supp.
November 1998]
shares of any class35 if the court finds that (1) the director engaged
in fraudulent or dishonest conduct, or gross abuse of authority or
discretion, with respect to the corporation 36 and (2) removal is in
the best interest of the corporation.37
(b) The court that removes a director may bar the director from
reelection for a period prescribed by the court.38
(c) If shareholders commence a proceeding under subsection (a),
they shall make the corporation a party defendant. 39
The removal remedy under the Model Act applies only to the
removal of directors, but some state statutes contain similar
provisions regarding the judicial removal of officers.40
Cases on directorial removal are not uniform. While most of
them pertain to close corporations,41 public corporations are not
immune from the circumstances that give rise to the removal
1997). However, a 10% shareholder may bring an action in its own right. See MODEL
BUS. CORP. Acr ANN. § 8.09 official cmt. (Supp. 1997). Part III will argue that removal
statutes should be amended to eliminate the special treatment for the 10% shareholders.
35. The threshold may apply to the shares of any class or all outstanding shares.
Compare Az. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-809(a) (West 1996) ("ten percent of the outstanding
shares of any class") with N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 716(c) (McKinney 1986 & Supp. 1998)
("ten percent of the votes of the outstanding shares, whether or not entitled to vote").
36. This elevated threshold for misbehavior is an important starting point for the
application of the remedy, given the extraordinary nature of judicial removal. As
explained below, it pays tribute to the primacy of the shareholder voting rights as the first
fundamental interest pertinent to the removal remedy. All jurisdictions that provide for
judicial removal of directors have a similar high standard, with minor variations. Some
examples of such variations include: Az. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-809(a)(1) (West 1996)
("fraudulent conduct or intentional criminal conduct"); ALA. STAT. § 10.06.463 (Michie
1996) ("fraudulent or dishonest acts, gross neglect of duty, or gross abuse of authority");
MIcH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 450.1514 (West 1990) ("fraudulent, illegal, or dishonest
conduct, or gross abuse of authority or discretion").
37. This element is essential in that it reflects the second major interest pertinent to
the removal remedy. However, some states have disregarded it. See, e.g., ALA. STAT. §
10.06.463 (Michie 1996).
38. Some jurisdictions limit this period. See, e.g., AZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 10-809(b)
(West 1996) (limiting the bar to no more than five years). The test proposed in Part IV of
this article will differentiate between situations where imposition of the bar is justified and
situations where it is not.
39. Some removal statutes do not contemplate such a requirement. See, e.g., N.Y.
Bus. CORP. LAW § 716(c) (McKinney 1986 & Supp. 1998).
40. See, e.g., N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 716(c) (McKinney 1986 & Supp. 1998). The
removal of~officers raises issues distinct from those raised by the removal of directors
(except where such officers are elected directly by shareholders rather than by the board
of directors), and therefore is beyond the scope of this article.
41. See, e.g., Ross Sys. Corp. v. Ross, No. CIV.A. 10378,1993 WL 49778 (Del. Ch. Feb.
22, 1993); Demoulas v. Demoulas, No. CIV.A.90-2344, 1996 WL 511519 (Mass. Super. Ct.
Aug. 20,1996).
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remedy.42  Removal actions are usually brought by minority
shareholders,43  but majority shareholders44  or corporations
themselves45 sometimes need to resort to this remedy as well.
Unfortunately, the scarce legislative history of the removal
remedy46 and the cacophony among the cases 47 do not provide an
adequate guide for understanding the interests implicated by the
removal remedy or for the remedy's application. Part II will develop
a philosophical foundation for the remedy by identifying and
analyzing the competing interests implicated by the removal remedy
and by explaining its place among other comparable remedies in
corporate law.
H. Philosophy of the Removal Remedy: Three Fundamental
Interests in Concert and at Odds
Three fundamental interests are key in fashioning a removal
remedy.48 The first is the shareholders' inherent right to remove
directors. This right is the mirror image of the right to elect
directors.49 The rights shareholders enjoy to install or remove
42. See, e.g., Management Techs., Inc. v. Morris, 961 F. Supp. 640, 642 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)
(the shares of Management Technologies, Inc. were traded on NASDAQ). For a
description of Management Techs., see infra notes 153-56, 257-59 and accompanying text.
43. See, e.g., Atkins v. Hughes, 282 P. 787 (Cal. 1929). For a description of Atkins, see
infra notes 118-20, 146-50 and accompanying text.
44. See, e.g., Markovitz v. Markovitz, 8 A.2d 46 (Pa. 1939). For a description of
Markovitz, see infra notes 108-11 and accompanying text.
45. See, e.g., Management Techs., 961 F. Supp. at 642.
46. The Official Comment to section 8.09 of the Model Act is remarkably brief. See
MODEL Bus. CORP. Act ANN. § 8.09 official cmt. (Supp. 1997). The legislative history of
section 8.09 is mysterious. See supra note 16. The legislative history of state removal
statutes is simple: the states follow the Model Act. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 10-2B-8.09 cmt.
1 (1994).
47. See supra notes 10-15 and accompanying text; see also infra Part IV.A and the
analysis of cases developed throughout the article.
48. While the reasons favoring the removal remedy in the context of not-for-profit
corporations are even more compelling than in the business corporations context, the
interests involved in crafting a removal remedy outside the business corporations context
are different and will not be examined here. For a discussion of other interests
conceivably relevant to the removal remedy, see infra note 79 (arguing that the situations
where the interests of a particular shareholder-rather than those of the corporation-
have been infringed upon require finding a different balance between the interests
involved); infra note 169 (reaching a similar conclusion with respect to situations where
the interests of the corporation's creditors, employees or other parties were violated);
infra notes 163-65 and accompanying text (observing that there exist other remedies
designed to protect certain interests outside of the corporate context, which also require a
separate analysis).
49. This right has been named as one of the mandatory provisions of corporate law
that have not been loosened even in the ultimately non-mandatory Delaware corporate
statute. See Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Mandatory Structure of Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L.
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directors constitute a form of corporate democracy. This interest is
viewed as predominant in jurisdictions that do not authorize judicial
removal. 50
The second fundamental interest is that of the corporation.
Apparently, it is the need to protect corporate interests that inspired
the recent proliferation of removal statutes. The best interests of the
corporation imply the maximization of corporate profits and often
coincide with shareholders' collective interests.5' From the
corporation's standpoint, however, the mere fact that shareholders
take no action to dismiss a director does not mean that retaining the
director furthers the corporation's interests (or shareholders'
collective interests), at least in the absence of shareholders'
affirmative and unanimous decision to retain the misbehaving
director. To protect the corporation against continuing abuse by the
director, it may be necessary to remove him.52 Removal cases
demonstrate that the spectrum of directorial misconduct that may
create a need for such protection ranges from fraudulent diversion of
corporate funds for the purposes of self-enrichment 53 to continuous
demoralizing conduct apparently caused by a director's vanity and
bad temper.54
These two interests are associated with a particular corporation
but develop in the context of the marketplace. The third fundamental
interest, that of the market, may invite application of the judicial
removal remedy in order to discourage other similarly placed
executives from committing fraud at other companies.
When shareholders cure directorial wrongdoing by removing a
director themselves, the three interests are in harmony and the
judicial removal remedy is unnecessary. When, however,
shareholders fail to take action to remove misbehaving directors,
tension between these three interests arises. The first interest of
shareholder democracy, if taken alone, unconditionally prohibits the
judicial removal of directors. Such a postulate is in conflict with the
REV. 1549, 1553 (1989). This provision, however, in good company with many other
provisions in corporate law, was discussed by Professor Romano from the opposite
standpoint. For a challenge to the mandatory nature of corporate law rules, see Roberta
Romano, Answering the Wrong Question: The Tenuous Case for Mandatory Corporate
Laws, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 1599,1599-1600 (1989).
50. See supra note 4; see also supra notes 22-26 and accompanying text.
51. For a description of what constitutes the best interests of the corporation, see infra
note 81 and accompanying text.
52. See infra notes 83-99 and accompanying text for a discussion of the underpinnings
of other remedies with respect to directorial misconduct.
53. See, e.g., O'Brocta v. O'Brocta, No. CIV-88-527E, 1989 WL 19606, at *3
(W.D.N.Y. Feb. 24,1989).
54. See, e.g., Markovitz v. Markovitz, 8 A.2d 46,47 (Pa. 1939).
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other two interests that favor removing directors without concerted
shareholder action and suggest disregarding the shareholder
prerogative to remove. The interest of shareholder democracy is in
more profound conflict with the interests of the market than with the
interests of the corporation because it is more logical to assume that
shareholders may want to remove directors to protect the interests of
their corporation than to serve the general interests of the market.
Yet there may also be tension between the interests of the
corporation and those of the market. Indeed, one of these categories
of interests fully encompasses, but also goes beyond, the other. The
interests of the corporation constitute the more narrow category, and
removal to pursue the interests of the market would cover all the
cases where removal would be necessary in order to protect the
interests of the corporation, but not vice versa. Removal to protect a
corporation does not present a threat to the interests of the market,
but instead furthers its goals-dismissal of the director acts as a signal
to other potential wrongdoers not only within the company but also in
other companies, bolsters a sense that the market is being policed and
represents a form of punishment for wrongs committed.
However, the reasons for removal that investors in the
marketplace as a whole might favor may be in conflict with the
interests of a particular corporation. While a director who engaged in
misconduct has injured the corporation in the past, his removal may
be contrary to the interests of the corporation overall or in the future.
For example, a director may have knowingly failed to disclose to the
corporation his interest in a certain transaction from which he
benefited but which did not cause the corporation noticeable harm. If
such a director does not exhibit recidivist tendencies, has otherwise
demonstrated managerial ability and maximizes the corporation's
profits overall, removing him may not be in the corporation's best
interests.
The Remillard Brick case55 illustrates this principle and a
comprehensive approach to the determination of the interests of the
corporation. On the one hand, two clever and dishonest directors of
affiliated brick manufacturing companies devised a scheme whereby
they diverted the profits from the sale of bricks manufactured by
these companies to a sales corporation owned by the two directors,
used the equipment of the manufacturing companies for the benefit
of their sales corporation, and engaged in other related misconduct.
The trial court found that the directors breached their duties as
directors and officers and committed fraud upon the manufacturing
companies. 56 On the other hand, the profits of the manufacturing
55. Remillard Brick Co. v. Remillard-Dandini Co., 241 P.2d 66 (Cal. Ct. App. 1952).
56. See id. at 76.
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companies skyrocketed during their directorship. As the appellate
court noted, "[the] trial court was undoubtedly impressed by the fact
that [the directors] did a first rate job in promoting sales and selling
the products of the manufacturing companies, and in carrying out a
rehabilitation program for those companies."57  While it is
conceivable that the interest of the market may have called for
removal of talented but dishonest directors, the interests of the
corporation appeared to compel the opposite outcome. The proven
managerial ability of the two directors was one of the two grounds on
which the court decided not to remove the two directors.58 In a recent
Massachusetts case, however, the court acknowledged a director's
accomplishments, but removed him notwithstanding his managerial
talents.59
The approach proposed in this article will resolve the tension
among these three interests.
A. The Interest of Shareholder Democracy (First Fundamental Interest)
Many forms of Government have been tried, and will be tried in
this world of sin and woe. No one pretends that democracy is
perfect or all-wise. Indeed, it has been said that democracy is
the worst form of Government except all those other forms that
have been tried from time to time.
-WINSTON CHURCHILL6 0
A common foundation underlies both U.S. corporate law and
society-that of representative democracy.61 This form of governance
reconciles twin countervailing constraints. The first is that a large
organization cannot function if managed directly in all respects by all
its members. Thus, a government, a committee or a board is
necessary for the "representative" function of the representative
democracy. The opposite constraint is that the members should
57. Id.
58. Id. The other reason for retaining the directors used by the court (directors' vote
to reelect themselves) appears invalid. See infra notes 138-44 and accompanying text.
59. See Demoulas v. Demoulas, No. CIV.A.90-2344, 1996 WL 511519, at *7 (Mass.
Super. Ct. Oct. 1, 1996). The court, however, did not weigh the interests of the
corporation versus the interests of the market or other interests. Indeed, while the court
claimed to be protecting the interests of the corporation, it in fact was protecting the
interests of certain shareholders. For a discussion of this issue, see infra note 79.
60. WINSTON CHURCHILL, SPEECH IN THE HOUSE OF Commons (Nov. 11, 1947),
reprinted in 7 WINSTON S. CHURCHILL: HIS COMPLETE SPEECHES 1897-1963, at 7566
(Robert Rhodes James ed., 1974).
61. For a critical approach to the analogy between modem public corporations and
democratic institutions, see Stephen M. Bainbridge, Revisiting the One Share/One Vote
Controversy: The Exchanges' Uniform Voting Rights Policy, 22 SEC. REG. L.J. 175, 200-05
(1994). This criticism, however, is directed mostly at an analogy drawn between corporate
democracy and direct, rather than representative, democracy.
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participate in governing the organization to the extent necessary to
ensure that their representatives serve the interests of the
organization and its members. This is the "democracy" component of
the representative democracy.
Corporate democracy is not unassailable. Critics of the concept
have claimed that shareholders are largely apathetic voters, so that a
"democratic" process in fact leads to the undemocratic result of self-
controlling boards.62 While such criticism may be deserved, it
constitutes insufficient grounds to invalidate the existing system of
corporate governance. Indeed, the intimate involvement of
shareholders in the corporate affairs of close corporations negates any
claim of shareholder apathy. Moreover, in public corporations,
shareholder apathy is mitigated by the recent trend of increased
involvement of institutional investors in corporate governance. 63 In
addition, the market for corporate control is predicated on
shareholder voting.64
Further, the system of corporate democracy rests on the principle
that individuals are the best judges of their interests. This is the
fundamental tenet upon which any market economy is based.
Abdication of this principle would lead to corporate control
mechanisms inconsistent with a market economy. In an extreme case,
such an abandonment could imply transferring the functions of the
corporate electorate to a regulatory authority such as the Securities
and Exchange Commission. This seemingly absurd scenario is not the
science fiction of corporate law: it has been tried in socialist
economies and has failed. Thus, although less than ideal, corporate
democracy should be entitled to share Churchill's indulgence of
political democracy as being preferable to its alternatives.65
Shareholder voting is one of the very few ways in which
shareholders engage in corporate democracy. 66 This is perhaps the
main reason why corporate law is generally very respectful of the
62. See, e.g., Christopher Stanley, Corporate Personality and Capitalist Relations: A
Critical Analysis of the Artifice of Company Law, 19 CAMBRIAN L. REv. 97, 106 (1988);
Harold Marsh, Jr., If It Ain't Broke, Don't Fix It, in COMMENTARIES ON CORPORATE
STRUCrURE AND GOVERNANCE 293,294 (Donald E. Schwartz ed., 1979).
63. See infra note 117 and accompanying text.
64. According to many scholars, the market for corporate control functions to reduce
agency costs and improve the efficiency of corporations by replacing underperforming
management. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Corporate Control
Transactions, 91 YALE LJ. 698, 715-16 (1982); Richard M. Buxbaum, The Internal
Division of Powers in Corporate Governance, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1671,1672 (1985).
65. See supra text accompanying note 60.
66. In a representative democracy, the connection (or dividing line) between the
representatives and the represented implies the existence of residual selection, policy-
setting, ratifying, or monitoring powers in the principal-agent relationship. See Buxbaum,
supra note 64, at 1671. These powers are exercised by shareholder voting. Id
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precept that electing and removing directors is an inherent right of
shareholders. 67 By electing a director and not removing him after
allegations of a misdeed, shareholders could be indicating a
preference to keep the director. This indication is reinforced if
shareholders actually reelect the director.
Should shareholders' rights to remove directors be honored even
when directors have engaged in gross misconduct? Some may say
that doing so would be tantamount to granting such directors a license
to steal-a socially unwelcome concept and one that is seemingly
incompatible with proper corporate governance. Others may assert
that "nothing is wrong" with the judicial removal of misbehaving
directors because under the criminal law a court may "remove" one
guilty of gross violations all the way to prison.68 Such arguments for
removal go right to the heart of the removal remedy, to the very
"Why?" of it. They would have merit if the removal remedy were
designed primarily to punish and deter. If the remedy is not designed
for this purpose (and Section C of this Part will argue that it is not),
these arguments ring hollow.
If the goal of the remedy is instead to protect a corporation from
misbehaving directors, and the corporation's owners have chosen not
to exercise their power to "protect" the corporation in such a manner,
then why should the court deny shareholders their right to chart for
themselves the best course for their corporation by voting for or
against removal? 69 It is their corporation, after all.
67. See, e.g., Auer v. Dressel, 118 N.E.2d 590, 593 (N.Y. 1954) (stating that
stockholders who are empowered to elect directors have the inherent power to remove
them for cause); Ross Sys. Corp. v. Ross, No. CIV.A.10378, 1993 WL 49778, at *17-18
(Del. Ch. Feb. 22, 1993) (stating that only shareholders-not courts-are empowered to
remove a director). For a description of many other authorities for the courts' recognition
of shareholders' inherent powers to elect and remove directors, see Davis, supra note 4.
68. See, e.g., Barnard, supra note 11.
There is nothing inherently "wrong" and certainly nothing unconstitutional, in
the notion that a court, even in a civil case, may deprive a defendant of his means
of livelihood. The constitution does not guarantee that a person can have the job
of his choice, or even work in the profession of his choice. While the "right to
practice one's profession is... precious," it is by no means inviolate, as may be
seen in any regulated profession for which barriers to entry have been
established and upheld, or in any case in which a professional's license is
revoked.
IaM at 46-47. Professor Barnard, however, criticizes the removal provisions in the
Remedies Act on other grounds.
69. The role of shareholders as the corporation's owners who have an inherent right to
elect and remove directors is somewhat undermined by the phenomenon of separation of
ownership and voting rights in corporations. For an explanation of this phenomenon, see
infra notes 121-23. If directors' misbehavior harms the corporation, but those with power
to remove the directors fail to act because their voting rights are not connected to
ownership interests in the corporation, the circumstances could justify a finding of a
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Indeed, when courts interfere with corporate governance by
removing duly elected directors, the intrusion may be more
fundamental than a court's intervention in corporate affairs through a
typical derivative action. A successful derivative action interferes
with corporate authority-that of the board-by bypassing the board
and advancing a claim to which the corporation is a party. In
achieving the enforcement of a corporate contract, for example, the
derivative action may cause only an external change to the
corporation, leaving the essential corporate structure intact. Courts
invariably exercise restraint in making such an external change if the
board is capable of making the change itself.70
By contrast, a successful judicial removal of directors interferes
with corporate democracy by affecting the process by which
shareholders elect their representatives. In exercising the removal
remedy, the court usurps the shareholders' prerogative by
disregarding the results of democratic elections and taking the liberty
of revoking shareholders' representatives. More importantly, the
removal effects an internal structural change within the corporation.
In altering the composition of the authoritative body elected through
corporate democracy and modifying the corporate bargain,7' the
"divergence of interests impairment" to shareholder voting and subsequent removal. See
infra Part U.B.2. In the event directors' misbehavior harms a particular class of
shareholders who have substantial ownership rights but not the corresponding voting
rights (such as preferred shareholders), such misbehavior could be addressed by a
different removal remedy. See infra note 79. Some further special tailoring of applicable
rules might be necessary to effect removal where there is a profound separation of
ownership and control.
70. This is the essence of the business judgement rule. For a description of the
business judgement rule, see infra note 275 and accompanying text.
71. The contractual approach to corporate law (where a corporation is viewed as a
"nexus of contracts") is widely accepted. For an overview of the discussion on this topic,
see Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Debate on Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law, 89
COLUM. L. Rnv. 1395 (1989); see also William A. Klein, The Modern Business
Organization: Bargaining Under Constraints, 91 YALE L.J 1521 (1982); Oliver Williamson,
Corporate Governance, 93 YALE L.J 1197 (1984). But for recent critical theories, see
William W. Bratton, Jr., The New Economic Theory of the Firm: Critical Perspectives from
History, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1989). The contractual approach has been used to justify
contractual freedom of the parties in corporate law. See, e.g., Dennis W. Carlton & Daniel
R. Fischel, The Regulation of Insider Trading, 35 STAN. L. REv. 857 (1983); Frank H.
Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. L. Rnv. 1416
(1989).
Why do investors entrust such stupendous sums to managers whose acts are
essentially unconstrained by legal rules? The answers lie in, and help explain, the
economic structure of corporate law. The corporation is a complex set of explicit
and implicit contracts, and corporate law enables the participants to select the
optimal arrangement for the many different sets of risks and opportunities that
are available in a large economy. No one set of terms will be best for all; hence
the 'enabling' structure of corporate law.
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internal change may affect all corporate actions, not just one, and is
more lasting and troubling than the external one.72 Thus, courts
should exercise at least the same restraint in making the internal
change as they do in making the external one.
One may take the position that such an internal change is
beneficial to the corporation and that shareholders should be grateful
to the court for performing the unpleasant task of removing a
misbehaving director. This position, however, assumes that
shareholders would have answered "I surely would" to the question
of whether they would have removed the director for misconduct.
But would they? One author has argued that shareholders would
not vote to retain a director or officer after they became aware that
he violated securities laws, even if the corporation enjoyed a short-
term benefit from the violation.73 If this were true, then there would
be even less reason for shareholders to retain a director who
defrauded the corporation. However, there is precedent to show that
dozens of directorial candidates each year disclose various misdeeds,
such as indictment for money laundering, and that even corporate
boards (which are expected to be wiser than shareholders) with full
knowledge of managers' misdeeds reappoint managers guilty of tax
evasion, forgery, and embezzlement at the companies where they
served in a fiduciary capacity.74 Nor is this phenomenon unknown in
the political arena.75
Shareholders may desire to retain a guilty director for the same
legitimate reason that a court may decline to remove him: retaining
Id. at 1418.
72. In addition, voting rights may have value to shareholders. If so, an undue
limitation on voting rights in the form of the judicial removal of directors may not be
consistent with shareholders' wealth maximization as the main objective of corporate law.
Voting rights might even be considered "property." See United States v. Local 560 of Int'l
Bhd. of Teamsters, 780 F.2d 267, 281-82 (3d Cir. 1985) (holding that union members' right
to elect their representatives is "property," the extortion of which may be in violation of
the Hobbs Act), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1740 (1986).
73. See W. Hardy Callcott, Patterns of SEC Enforcement under the 1990 Remedies Act:
Officer-And-Director Bars, 21 SEC. REG. L.. 347,370 (1994).
74. See Jayne W. Barnard, When is a Corporate Executive "Substantially Unfit to
Serve"?, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1489, 1500 (1992).
75. In 1998, polls showed a significant (almost 40%!) disparity between public belief in
President Clinton's honesty and his job approval ratings. Commentators have attributed
the President's high job approval ratings to the strong economy and have concluded that
perceptions of honesty and personal integrity are not critical factors driving public opinion
regarding whether or not the President should resign. See, e.g., David S. Broder and
Claudia Deane, Poll: Clinton Critics More Likely to Vote; But Public's Support for
President, Disdain for Investigation May Trouble House GOP, WASH. POST, Sept. 30,
1998, at A6; Will Lester, Clinton's Job-Approval Rating Stays Above the Chaos Below,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Sept. 14, 1998; Warren P. Strobel, Experts Tie Clinton's Ratings to
Healthy Economy, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 6,1998, at A13.
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the director may be in the best interests of the corporation. Indeed,
courts have recognized that there may be circumstances in which a
director's managerial talents outweigh an instance of dishonesty.76
Whether in making such a calculation or otherwise, however,
shareholders may legitimately understand the best interests of the
corporation differently than the court. More importantly,
shareholders have no duty to justify their choice, and are free to
endorse a dishonest director because of their forgiving nature, the
director's charisma, or other idiosyncratic reasons not apparent to the
court.
Courts, therefore, should exercise restraint in removing directors.
Indeed, the reluctance of courts to use the removal remedy absent
statutory authorization and the establishment of a high behavioral
threshold for directors' removal in corporate statutes should probably
be attributed to judicial and legislative respect for the shareholders'
inherent right to elect and remove directors.
B. Balance Between the Interest of the Corporation (Second Fundamental
Interest) and the Prerogatives of its Owners
Lex semper dabit remedium.
-ROMAN ADAGE
77
(1) Interests of the Corporation as the Removal Remedy's Raison d'Etre
The need to protect the interests of the corporation from
directorial78 wrongdoing is the removal remedy's raison d'etre. Of the
76. In Remillard Brick Co. v. Remillard-Dandini Co., the court decided that while
directors made improper profits in self-interested transactions, they could remain directors
subject to the return of profits because they have demonstrated managerial ability. 241
P.2d 66, 77 (Cal. Ct. App. 1952). For a more detailed description, see supra notes 55-58
and accompanying text.
77. "The law will always give a remedy." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 913 (6th ed.
1990).
78. While an individual director has fewer opportunities to inflict harm upon a
corporation than does an officer, the harm that he can inflict is not negligible. In
particular, directorial misbehavior can manifest itself in actions that are not the subject of
informed decisions by the board of directors as a whole. Such actions might include
misappropriation of corporate opportunities and various forms of self-dealing, failure to
disclose conflicts of interests when a decision is submitted for consideration by the board,
or disclosure of confidential information to third parties. While some of the same offenses
can also be committed by officers and other employees, such employees can be terminated
immediately upon the revelation of their misbehavior. Directors, however, cannot be
removed without coordinated shareholder action. Hence the need to protect corporate
interests through the judicial removal remedy. As to the balance between shareholder
prerogative to remove and the need to protect the interests of the corporation, see infra
Part II.B.2-3 In addition, in close corporations directors often perform the functions of
officers, or hold positions as directors and officers simultaneously, thus having even
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reasons to pursue a removal remedy in the face of shareholder
inaction, upholding the interests of the corporation is the most
intuitive, the most frequently used, and the most congruent with the
goals of other corporate law remedies.79 It is also a necessary
condition to judicial removal under the Model Act and most of the
removal statutes.80
The interests of the corporation imply maximizing corporate
profits. Determining whether a particular course of action is in the
corporation's interests requires an analysis of whether the many
repercussions of such a course of action will on balance contribute to
maximize the profits of the corporation. In the context of removal,
the principle of profit maximization means that if a director has
special qualities that outweigh an instance of misconduct, his removal
greater opportunities for abuse. The analysis proposed in this article applies not only to
directors, but also to officers who are elected directly by shareholders.
79. A possible avenue for the expansion of the removal remedy would be its
application to situations where the director's wrongdoing is directed against some of the
shareholders, rather than the corporation itself. Such a new remedy, however, should be
subject to different rules, because it would be designed to address a different wrong.
The court in Demoulas v. Demoulas attempted to use the existing remedy for such a
different injury. No. CIV.A.90-2344, 1996 WL 511519 (Mass. Super. Ct. Aug. 20, 1996).
The court endorsed the goal of upholding the interests of the corporation in order to
justify directorial removal, but interpreted corporate interests in an original way. The
fraud at issue included redemption of some shareholders' stock in breach of the director's
fiduciary duty and other similar stock manipulations. The director defrauded only certain
shareholders, rather than the corporation itself. While recognizing the managerial abilities
of the defendant director, the court announced that "it goes without saying that the best
interests of a closely held family corporation cannot be advanced by a director who
defrauds its shareholders." Id. at *8. As is often the case with such reasoning, it does not
go without saying. Would the same reasoning apply if the director defrauded a 1%
shareholder and the latter lost $500, but the director maximizes corporate profits and
$1,000,000 of such profits are attributable to the director's activities? Could the interests
of a public, as opposed to a close, corporation be advanced by a director who defrauds its
shareholders? The court's justification of removal is appealing on an emotional level but
intellectually troubling. The court was trying to stretch the interests of the corporation to
accommodate the interests of some of its shareholders in order to avoid resolving the
conflict between such interests.
The rules applicable to a removal remedy designed to protect the interests of a
particular shareholder would be different. Such rules would need to reflect an appropriate
balance between the shareholders' prerogative to remove directors, the interests of the
corporation, the interests of a particular shareholder, and possible public policy interests.
Since the injury would be suffered by a particular shareholder, the action brought by such
a shareholder would be direct, rather than derivative, and the board should not have the
right, see infra Part III.B, to preclude the advancement of such an action.
For a brief discussion regarding the use of the removal remedy to protect the interests
of the corporation's creditors, employees and other corporate constituencies, see infra
note 167.
80. See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. AcT ANN. § 8.09(a)(2) (Supp. 1997); ALA. CODE §
10-2B-8.09(a)(2) (1994).
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would be against corporate interests. If, however, the director does
not have such redeeming characteristics (as is more often the case),
the corporation's interests require removing the director to protect
the corporation from his continuing abuse. 81
While the removal remedy overlaps slightly with other remedies
in the courts' arsenal, it is by no means redundant.82 The other two
main remedies that address similar wrongs and are intended to have a
comparable effect are the appointment of a receiver for the
corporation in the absence of insolvency83 and an injunction
restraining directors from taking certain actions.84
The appointment of a receiver for the corporation has the effect
of removing the entire board of directors and is usually labeled by
courts as a "harsh measure" and "a remedy of last resort,"85 to be
used "only in a clear case of extreme necessity. '86 According to one
court, "[A] receivership is the most drastic remedy and the most
expensive luxury known to the realm of law." 87  In certain
circumstances, for instance where only one director engaged in
81. The interests of the corporation generally coincide with shareholders' collective
interests, assuming the shareholders' equal treatment and not taking into account any
illegal or inappropriate benefits a particular shareholder may derive from the corporation.
The board of directors is entrusted with the responsibility of determining and pursuing
corporate interests. See infra Part III.B. For a description of the interests of the
corporation's creditors, employees and other parties that have a stake in the corporation's
well-being, see infra note 167.
82. Judicial removal is referred to in this article as a "removal remedy." In essence,
the removal remedy is as much a right as it is a remedy. Perhaps it is a "remedial right"-
this is how at least one author at the turn of the century termed certain remedies in the
corporate context. See Augustus H. Fenn, The Remedial Rights of Corporations Against
Their Directors, 3 YALE L.J. 111 (1894). Not all remedies in corporate law could be
named "remedial rights." For the distinction between the appraisal remedy and the
underlying shareholders' right to dissent, see H. Kanda & Saul Levmore, The Appraisal
Remedy and the Goals of Corporate Law, 32 UCLA L. REV. 429 (1985).
83. This remedy should be distinguished from the appointment of receivers for an
insolvent corporation and receivers for certain assets of a corporation, but not the
corporation as such. For a discussion regarding different types of receivers, see 16
FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS §§ 7665-66 (1998).
84. For a general overview of most judicially imposed remedies used in corporate law,
see ALFRED F. CONARD, CORPORATIONS IN PERSPECTIVE 379-415 (1976); see also 1 F.
HODGE O'NEAL AND ROBERT B. THOMPSON, O'NEAL'S OPPRESSION OF MINORITY
SHAREHOLDERS, § 3:15 (2d ed. 1985); DEBORAH A. DEMOTT, SHAREHOLDER
DERIVATIVE ACTIONS: LAW & PRACTICE § 7:06 (1994).
85. 16 FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 7671
(1998) (citing Mayhue v. Mayhue, 485 A.2d 494 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984)). For an overview of
courts' reasoning with respect to appointments of receivers, see Morse v. Metro. S.S. Co.,
100 A. 219 (N.J. Ch. 1917)
86. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Patterson-Emerson-Comstock, 227 F. Supp. 208,
216 (N.D. Ind. 1963).
87. Furrer v. Nebraska Bldg. & Inv. Co., 189 N.W. 359,364 (Neb. 1922).
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misbehavior, appointing a receiver and thereby effectively replacing
the entire board may be excessive, and removing only the
misbehaving director would be a more appropriate cure.88
Appointing a receiver can also have unwanted side effects, such as an
adverse reaction on the part of customers and suppliers who refuse to
do business with the corporation on the same favorable basis.8 9
Although appointing a receiver is a more drastic remedy than
removing a director, courts have exhibited confidence in their power
to invoke it.9° A more narrowly targeted, less expensive and less
extreme removal remedy, however, is not always authorized by
statute. In such circumstances, courts feel more comfortable either
imposing an overly-inclusive, counter-productive remedy simply
because it is authorized by law9' or denying the appropriate remedy
only because it is not.92 Neither result is constructive.
While appointing a receiver may be an overinclusive remedy, an
injunction may have the opposite drawback of being underinclusive.
Injunctions are generally narrowly targeted at preventing specific
transactions or actions from occurring. 93  An unusually broad
injunction, which would have the effect of suspending a director from
office for the remainder of his tenure, would be necessary to prevent
general fraud and abuse by the director.94 Accordingly, certain courts
88. In Cumberland Publishing Co. v. Adams Real Estate Corp., 432 S.W.2d 808, 813
(Ky. Ct. App. 1968), the court reversed the appointment of a receiver even though the
court acknowledged that majority shareholder's conduct was "tantamount to a fraud upon
the minority stockholder." The court's position was that receivership should be denied
where another adequate, less severe remedy is available. The alternative remedies
suggested by the court, however, did not include removal of directors, possibly because no
such remedy was authorized by the state statute.
89. For the negative consequences of appointing a receiver for a solvent corporation,
see Steven C. Bahls, Resolving Shareholder Dissention: Selection of the Appropriate
Equitable Remedy, 15 J. CORP. L. 285,309 (1990).
90. See, e.g., Cumberland Publ'g Co. v. Adams Real Estate Corp., 432 S.W.2d 808 (Ky.
Ct. App. 1968) (reversing trial court's appointment of receiver). See supra note 88 for a
complete description.
91. See id
92. See Ross Sys. Corp. v. Ross, No. CIV.A.10378, 1993 WL 49778, at *17-18 (Del. Ch.
Feb. 22, 1993). For a description, see supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text.
93. See 1 DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES 223-26 (2d ed. 1993). Structural
injunctions may be an exception to this rule. See iL at 225-26 (referring also to OWEN
FIss, THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCON (1978)).
94. Sometimes courts do make strenuous attempts to address such behavior through
injunctions. For instance, the court in Management Technologies, Inc v. Morris held that
it was unable to remove a director in a suit brought by the chief executive officer of the
corporation in the absence of a statutory provision that the corporation itself may bring a
removal action. The court then enjoined the director from entering the premises of the
corporation absent prior written consent of the other directors or the chief executive
officer, but clarified that the injunction did not extend to the director's attendance of
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have taken the position that in the absence of statutory authorization
to exercise removal, they cannot do indirectly what may not be done
directly, and on that basis have refused to grant injunctions.95 Thus,
in a situation where there is a need to prevent a director from
exercising his duties for an extended period of time, applying the
removal remedy would be a more logical solution than stretching the
injunction beyond its usual confines.
Certainly, the removal remedy is not intended to serve as a
substitute for directors' liability (such as the return of an improper
financial benefit or the payment of damages) for wrongful actions, but
rather as a supplemental remedy that could accompany a suit for
damages against a director 96 as well as be invoked independently. In
the absence of the removal remedy, directors' financial liability may
not always be a sufficient cure, since it addresses past wrongs on a
case-by-case basis instead of preventing future abuse.97 Perhaps the
judicial removal remedy is not a panacea for directorial misbehavior.
It does, however, preclude future wrongdoing by physically detaching
the director from the position which enables him to indulge in
abuse.98 The removal remedy does not have the ambition of being
board meetings or discharging his duties as director. Management Techs., Inc. v. Morris,
961 F. Supp. 640,650-52 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
95. See Bayless v. Orne, 1 Free. Ch. 161, 176 (Miss. Ch. 1840) (holding that the court
could not suspend an officer indefinitely and thus do indirectly that which may not be
done directly); Harkey v. Mobley, 552 S.W.2d 79, 81 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977) (holding that
courts do not have power, absent statutory authority, to grant injunctions restraining
directors and officers from performing their corporate duties since this would have the
same effect as removal).
96. Indeed, a suit for judicial removal is usually coupled with a suit for damages or
disgorgement of profits. See, e.g., Remillard Brick Co. v. Remillard-Dandini Co., 241 P.2d
66 (Cal. Ct. App. 1952).
97. The argument that the deterrent effect of suits aspiring to impose financial liability
on directors is ample and thus directors do not need to be removed since they will
voluntarily stop misbehaving if caught once is not sustainable. The fact that not every
instance of misbehavior would necessarily be detected and successfully litigated
undermines the deterrence value of directors' financial liability. The imposition of
punitive damages would be required in order to make a genuine quantitative difference in
deterring directorial misbehavior. However, punitive damages are not used in actions
against directors. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Derivative Litigation under Part VII of the ALI
Principles of Corporate Governance: A Review of the Positions and Premises, in
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE - AMERICAN BAR AssOCIATION CONTINUING LEGAL
EDUCATION, November 1995, at 237, 269, available in Westlaw, CA 53 ALI-ABA 237,
269. They are very rarely used against individuals in general. See E. Donald Elliott, Why
Punitive Damages Don't Deter Corporate Misconduct Effectively, 40 ALA. L. REV. 1053,
1069 (1989); see also infra note 98.
98. Even in the law of tort, where punitive damages (unknown in suits against
corporate directors) are employed precisely in order to achieve a higher level of
deterrence, there is a consensus that there may be cases where an injunction as a means to
prevent or interrupt the wrong may be a necessary remedy. The removal remedy operates
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exclusive and can co-exist with any other remedies shareholders or
the corporation may have.99
Federal law has also given the judicial removal remedy sister
removal remedies, in particular in the Securities Enforcement
Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990 (the "Remedies
Act") 1°° and the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and
Enforcement Act of 1989 ("FIRREA"). 1°1 However, because such
remedies are exercised by federal agencies outside of the context of
corporate law, they are not a substitute for the judicial removal
remedy discussed in this article.'02
as the injunction equivalent in the corporate law context, where injunctions themselves
may be ineffective. See supra notes 93-95 and accompanying text.
99. Certainly, a shareholder in a public corporation may simply sell his shares, and a
shareholder in a close corporation may require the corporation to choose between
dissolution and purchasing the shareholder's shares at fair value. See MODEL Bus. CORP.
Acr ANN. §§ 14.30, 14.34 (Supp. 1997); see also J.A.C. Hetherington & Michael P.
Dooley, Illiquidity and Exploitation: A Proposed Statutory Solution to the Remaining Close
Corporation Problem, 63 VA. L. REV. 1 (1977). However, the fact that a shareholder can
leave does not mean that leaving should be his only option. The "love it or leave it"
rationale is usually used in marriage (and partnership) rather than in a corporation. For
an extended discussion on the "love it or leave it" concept, see Saul Levmore, Love It or
Leave It: Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Exclusivity of Remedies in Partnership and
Marriage, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 221 (1995). Aggrieved shareholders may not
necessarily want to leave the corporation. They may, for example, think that the price of
their shares has been negatively affected by the director's misbehavior. In addition,
confining the options of the shareholders opposing wrongdoing to exiting the corporation
would effectively give carte blanche and even an incentive to abusive directors (and
shareholders who elected them) to squeeze out minority shareholders. Therefore, the
shareholders' right to leave the corporation does not render other corporate law remedies,
judicial removal among them, dispensable.
100. Pub. L. No. 101-429, 104 Stat. 931 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77t(e), 78u(d)(2)
(1994)).
101. Pub. L. No. 101-73,103 Stat. 183 (1989).
102. Thus, the federal removal remedies will not be examined here, except where
occasional analogies are warranted. The removal remedies in the Remedies Act and
FIRREA extend well beyond those in state corporate statutes. The Remedies Act makes
numerous powerful changes to the federal securities laws, including reaffirming the
authority of the federal courts, in connection with injunctive actions brought by the
Securities and Exchange Commission, to issue orders that prohibit an individual from
serving either temporarily or permanently as an officer or director of publicly-held
companies if such an individual violates either Section 17(a)(1) of the Securities Act of
1933 or Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. For a general discussion of
the Remedies Act, see Matthew S. Morris, The Securities Enforcement Remedies and
Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990. By Keeping Up with the Joneses, the SEC's Enforcement
Arsenal is Modernized, 7 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 151 (1993). The Financial Institutions
Supervisory Act of 1966 (FISA) granted sweeping powers to certain federal banking
agencies to suspend and remove bank officials, in order to protect the interests of the
federally insured depository banking system. These powers were significantly fortified
and expanded by the enactment of FIRREA in the wake of the savings and loan disaster.
FIRREA provides that once an official is removed from his position, he is automatically
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Hence the removal remedy is not superfluous in light of other
existing judicial remedies. Could it be superfluous in light of the
shareholders' right to remove directors? The key question is: Why
should the court decide for shareholders what is in the best interests of
the corporation, depriving them of the opportunity to decide for
themselves? As a RULE, it should not.10 3
As an EXCEPTION to this rule, however, shareholder
prerogative to remove directors should yield to the interests of the
corporation where shareholders' inherent rights to remove are
meaningless or have been subject to abuse. This Section suggests that
there are two such situations of "impairment" to removal by
shareholders that may justify a court's intervention and overruling of
shareholders' choice to ignore or condone directorial misconduct.
(2) "Divergence of Interests Impairment" to Removal by Shareholders
The Official Comment to the Model Act uses the following
example to illustrate the need for a judicial removal remedy:
In a closely held corporation, the director charged with misconduct
is elected by voting group 1°4 or cumulative voting,10 5 and the
shareholders with the power to prevent his removal exercise that
power despite the existence of fraudulent or dishonest conduct.
The classic case is where the director charged with misconduct
himself possesses sufficient votes to prevent his own removal and
exercises his voting power to that end.1 6
The description in the Official Comment captures typical
removal cases involving fraud and dishonesty 0 7 However, the same
concern is applicable to a broader spectrum of cases. For example, in
subject to a total ban from the insured depository industry. For a general discussion of the
removal remedy in FIRREA, see Robert J. Basil, Suspension and Removal of Bank
Officials under the Financial Institutions Reform Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989
("FIRREA"), 18 J. LEGIS. 1 (1991).
103. See the reasons set forth in supra Part II.A.
104. The term "voting group" is used in the Model Act to indicate a class of shares that
has the right to vote separately from other classes on certain matters. See MODEL Bus.
CORP. ACr ANN. § 1.40(26) (Supp. 1997).
105. Cumulative voting is a system whereby a shareholder may apply all its votes to
vote for one candidate or spread them among several candidates. See, e.g., MODEL Bus.
CORP. Acr ANN. § 7.28 (Supp. 1997). This system allows certain minority shareholders
(who have a substantial amount, but not a majority, of votes) to have a guaranteed seat (or
seats) on the board of directors.
106. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACr ANN. § 8.09 official cmt. (Supp. 1997). A similar reason
was advanced in the Senate's report in support of the Remedies Act: "[P]ublic
shareholders may lack sufficient control to remove securities law violators from office or
otherwise to protect their own interests." S. REP. No. 101-337, at 22 (1990).
107. See, e.g., Ross Sys. Corp. v. Ross, No. CIV.A.10378, 1993 WL 49778, at *17-18
(Del. Ch. Feb. 22, 1993). For a description of Ross, see supra notes 23-26 and
accompanying text.
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Markovitz v. Markovitz,08 the court found that Victor, a young and
inexperienced director, harassed his fellow colleagues, employees and
customers:
He became the shadow of... the general manager, standing beside
him and humiliating him while he was transacting business with the
employees and customers;... demoralizing the office force by
making absurd requests for detailed information which he already
possessed;... and making himself so personally objectionable to
the officers, employees and customers of the company that its
interests were jeopardized, and the morale of the organization...
was impaired. °9
Although the plaintiffs held the majority of shares in the
corporation, they could not remove Victor because the minority
shareholders had elected him in exercise of their right to elect two
directors out of five by cumulative voting." 0  The minority
shareholders apparently did not want to remove Victor from his
directorship position because they were part of one family (Victor's
mother, his brother, and Victor himself)."' The court removed
Victor from his position as a director and barred him from reelection
for a period of two years." 2
The above examples mask the existence of a more general, yet
unarticulated, reason behind a shareholder's reluctance to remove a
director. In such situations, the interests of an individual shareholder
as an individual and as a shareholder diverge, thus impairing his
willingness to remove a director. I call this occurrence the
"divergence of interests impairment" to the removal of directors, to
distinguish it from the conflict of interests concept widely applied in
corporate law." 3
Corporate law views shareholders as "owners" of the
corporation." 4  Since the best interests of a corporation imply
maximization of corporate profits, stockholders' interests taken as a
whole and those of the corporation should coincide and shareholders
108. 8 A.2d. 46 (Pa. 1939).
109. Id. at 47.
110. See id
111. See id
112. .See id. at 48.
113. The notion of "divergence of interests" proposed here is broader than that of
"conflict of interests" in that the latter implies the existence of a duty owed by the
conflicted party, whereas shareholders generally owe no duty when they vote. See, e.g.,
ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 141 (1986); HARRY G. HENN & JOHN R.
ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS 637-44 (1983); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 299
(6th ed. 1990).
114. See, e.g., HENN & ALEXANDER, supra note 113, at 491 ("Inherent then in the
corporate setup is the idea that shareholders 'own' the corporation, but the board of
directors manages it.").
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should be interested in increasing the corporation's profits." 5
However, a particular shareholder would not necessarily be interested
in increasing corporate profits to share them eventually with other
shareholders, when the alternative is to divert a larger share of profits
directly into that shareholder's pocket.116
Directorial election provides certain stockholders with such an
opportunity. When a shareholder holds a substantial enough voting
power in the company, it has the ability to elect "its" representatives
to the board." 7  This situation creates a temptation for the
shareholder to elect a director who would act in the interest of his
elector at the expense of the corporation. Indeed, conspiracies
between shareholders and directors to take advantage of a
corporation are not unknown. For example, in Atkins v. Hughes,118
the trial court found that the majority shareholders conspired to elect
directors who were under their influence.119 The intent and purpose
of the conspiracy was the adoption of resolutions by directors
approving a construction project for the benefit of such majority
shareholders, but at the cost and expense of the corporation. 20
The potential for abuse of voting powers is augmented by the
delegation of shareholders' voting power to third parties, whether
temporarily or permanently, 121 and the existence of shares bearing
voting rights that do not correspond to the underlying economic
115. Economists have even used this understanding of the shareholders' interest in
increasing their corporation's profits as an argument in favor of expanding shareholders'
role in the management of the corporation. See, e.g., Michael C. Jensen & William H.
Meckling, Theory of the Firm Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership
Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
116. Conflicts of interest between a shareholder and a corporation manifest themselves
in various ways. One of them involves frivolous suits leading to collusive settlements. See,
e.g., Franklin A. Gevurtz, Who Represents the Corporation? In Search of a Better Method
for Determining the Corporate Interest in Derivative Suits, 46 U. PrlT. L. REV. 265, 287-97
(1985). See also infra notes 202-06 and accompanying text.
117. The instances of use of such power by shareholders are expanding. For examples
of such recent attempts on the part of institutional investors, see Bernard Black, Agents
Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional Investor Voice, 39 UCLA L. REV. 811, 842
(1992). In some other countries, this is a well established tradition. See generally Mark J.
Roe, Some Differences in Corporate Structure in Germany, Japan, and the United States,
102 YALE LJ. 1927 (1993).
118. 282 P. 787 (Cal. 1929).
119. Id. at789.
120. See id.
121. This is achieved by rules permitting irrevocable powers of attorney, see, e.g.,
MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. § 7.22 (Supp. 1997), voting trusts contemplating the
transfer of shares by shareholders to a trustee who is authorized to vote the shares on their
behalf (§ 7.30), and voting or shareholder agreements whereby shareholders agree on the
manner in which they will vote their shares (§§ 7.31, 7.32). Where this article refers to
shareholders, such reference also encompasses, when applicable, shareholder appointees.
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interests.122 These phenomena further widen the gap between the
interests of the corporation and the interests of those who elect
directors, thus seducing shareholder-director blocks into maximizing
their own profits instead of the profits of the corporation. 123
The divergence of interests impairment can also manifest itself in
other ways. Investors who fear losing corporate business have been
known to adopt a pro-management bias that may result in their
reluctance to vote for removal of directors.124 There are other
reasons why shareholders may wish to keep a culpable director even
when financial benefit is not at issue, for example when the director is
a relative or a friend.125
When the potential for a divergence of interests exists, corporate
law usually employs four main prophylactic or mitigating devices.
First, certain persons are excluded from decision-making in conflict of
interests situations. Thus, interested directors or shareholders are
prohibited from voting with respect to a transaction where their
interest in the corporation's well-being may be compromised. 126
Second, the decision-making process is shared among different levels.
Officers, directors, and, with respect to certain critical decisions,
shareholders, may have separate or joint rights to approve actions of
importance to the corporation.127 This power-sharing feature, by
122. For criticism of such separation of vote and ownership, see Louis Lowenstein,
Efficient Market Theory: Let the Punishment Fit the Crime, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 925,
940 (1994) and Jeffrey N. Gordon, Ties that Bond: Dual Class Common Stock and the
Problem of Shareholder Choice, in CORPORATE LAW AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 74-117
(Lucian Arye Bebchuk ed., 1990). For an approach defending such a rule, see Bainbridge,
supra note 61, at 175-219.
123. For the possible hazards of "opting out" of voting rights, see Robert C. Clark,
Contracts, Elites, and Traditions in the Making of Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV.
1703, 1709 (1989). For an application of the removal remedy to situations where there is a
gap between ownership and voting rights in corporations, see supra note 69.
124. Professor Black provides examples of how institutional investors that develop an
anti-manager reputation may lose corporate business or find it harder to gain new
business. He points out that such conflicts lead some institutions to vote pro-manager
even when doing so is likely to decrease company value. See Black, supra note 117, at 826.
See also Bernard S. Black and John C. Coffee, Jr., Hail Britannia? Institutional Investor
Behavior under Limited Regulation, 92 MICH. L. REv. 1997, 2059-61 (1997) (describing a
similar occurrence of compromised loyalty of institutional investors in the United
Kingdom).
125. See Markovitz v. Markovitz, 8 A.2d 46 (Pa. 1939). It is obvious from the facts of
the case that the director who was manifestly abusing a corporation was not removed
because he was a family member of the shareholders who elected him. For a more
detailed description, see supra notes 108-111 and accompanying text.
126. See, e.g., DEL. Bus. CORP. LAW § 144; see generally Kenneth B. Davis, Jr.,
Approval by Disinterested Directors, 20 J. CORP. L. 215 (1995).
127. See, e.g., HENN & ALEXANDER, supra note 113, § 180 at 466. The authors suggest
that the distribution of management functions within a corporation is even more
comprehensive: "Various functions in the organization and management of corporations
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providing a system of checks and balances, can lower the likelihood of
both poor and self-interested decisions. Third, where exclusion from
decision-making or sharing of responsibility is impossible or
insufficient, the law imposes a duty on the actors. Hence, directors
have fiduciary duties to the corporation and shareholders, and even
controlling shareholders have been held to owe duties to minority
shareholders in some circumstances. 128 Finally, a derivative action
can provide a check on the board's decisions.129 Although these
devices provide important controls necessary to ensure efficient
corporate governance, they are not employed in the context of the
corporate election and removal process.
Moreover, in their zealous protection of shareholder
prerogatives, corporate law rules have the unfortunate side effect of
creating an environment so conducive to self-interested voting as to
invite corruption.130  Not only is an "interested" shareholder
permitted to elect "its" directors, but majority shareholders are
expected to elect their representatives through the "one share-one
vote" rule and minority shareholders are encouraged to do the same
through cumulative voting.131 The mechanism of cumulative voting
permits the election of shareholders' "own" representatives on the
board regardless of how the votes of other shareholders are cast and
expands the divergence of interests hazard to minority shareholders
in addition to controlling shareholders. 132 In addition, shareholders
are permitted to elect their personal representatives via voting trusts
and voting agreements. 133 Thus, a particular shareholder may be the
are performed by: (a) promoters, (b) incorporators, (c) subscribers, (d) shareholders,
(e) directors, (f) officers, (g) other employees and agents, and occasionally (h) creditors."
IdL at 466-67.
128. See, e.g., ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW § 4.1 at 141 (1986).
Professors Easterbrook and Fischel described this third device as follows: "The fiduciary
principle is an alternative to direct monitoring. It replaces prior supervision with
deterrence, much as the criminal law uses penalties for bank robbery rather than pat-down
searches of everyone entering banks." See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 64, at 702.
They further state that such principles act "as a standard-form penalty clause in every
agency contract." Id
129. For a description of a derivative action, see supra note 33.
130. Encouragement of self-interested shareholder voting is intentional on the theory
that individuals are the best judges of their own self-interest and pursuit of their own self-
interest will result in the optimal allocation of resources. This system, however, does not
take into account the possible abuse of such right to the detriment of others. See supra
note 116 and accompanying text.
131. For a description of cumulative voting, see supra note 105.
132. For example, in Markovitz v. Markovitz, 8 A.2d 46 (Pa. 1939), the minority
shareholders (who had elected the misbehaving director by cumulative voting) were
blocking his removal. For a decription of Markovitz, see supra notes 108-111 and
accompanying text.
133. For a description of voting trusts and voting agreements, see supra note 121.
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only actor with the power to elect and remove a particular director.
No system of checks and balances exists in the corporate election and
removal process. Moreover, shareholders have no duty either to elect
directors who would best serve the corporation or to remove those
who are harmful, and they are free to exercise their election right
without justification or accountability. 1 4
The first three "anti-conflict" devices described above could not
be introduced into the shareholder voting process without changing
the fundamental principles of corporate law.135 In contrast, the
judicial removal of directors in narrowly defined circumstances could
constitute a more focused corrective step which would not be unduly
intrusive to the existing system of corporate governance. This step
would provide a "check" on shareholders' decisions parallel to that
placed on board decisions by derivative actions.
Some courts fail to recognize the divergence of interests
impairment in removal cases and as a consequence adopt erroneous
decisions.136 Others reach correct results but decline to develop a
theory for future use by courts. 37 As a result, the proper limits of
corporate democracy in divergence of interests situations remain
undefined.
In the Remillard Brick case,138 the California Court of Appeal
first correctly upheld a finding that two directors guilty of fraud were
required to disgorge their ill-gotten profits.139 Surprisingly, however,
while also upholding the decision of the trial court that refused to
remove the directors, the appellate court stated that the two directors
134. Certainly, directors do have fiduciary duties. However, the effectiveness of a duty
depends upon the remedies that are available in the event it is breached. Absent a
removal remedy, an offending director would be able to continue abuse even if sued for
damages inflicted by some of his prior actions. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
135. In addition, implementation of these measures is hardly feasible as a practical
matter. For example, it is hard to imagine how "interested" shareholders could be
excluded from voting for potentially unscrupulous candidates before their misconduct
becomes apparent.
136. See infra notes 138-42 and accompanying text.
137. For example, the appeal court in Brown v. North Ventura Road Development Co.
saw the shareholder's conflict of interest:
Whether the "stockholders"... be regarded as consisting only of the three
incorporators, or whether they consisted (as we hold below) of the persons to
whom shares were ultimately to be issued, it is clear that, over the opposition of
plaintiff, the majority required by section 810 could not have existed.
30 Cal. Rptr. 568, 571 n.2 (Cal. Ct. App. 1963). However, the appellate court, affirming
the removal of the director for misconduct, appears to contemplate that such removal
would be effective only until the director was "properly elected." Id. No theory was
developed by the court to support its ad hoc reasoning.
138. Remillard Brick Co. v. Remillard-Dandini Co., 241 P.2d 66, 73-76 (Cal. Ct. App.
1952).
139. Id.
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"not only are directors of the manufacturing companies, but are
[their] managing officers, and, for all practical purposes, control and
have a contract to purchase five-eighths of the outstanding stock."'140
Thus, the court recognized that the directors had in effect elected
themselves.141 It is obvious from the facts of the case that in the
directors' reelections the minority shareholder who owned the only
stock not controlled by the two directors did not vote for these
particular directors. 42 The court, however, adhered to the formal
rule that a director shall not be removed for acts committed during
his term of office if he is subsequently reelected. 14 In so holding, the
court in effect decided that the directors' self-reelection in a situation
where they had defrauded the corporation should be regarded as an
acceptable exercise of corporate democracy immunizing them from
liability.
When corporate democracy suffers a total breakdown because of
self-interest and fraud, why should it be protected? This is the critical
question that the Remillard Brick court failed not only to answer, but
even to ask. By blindly following rules designed to preserve
shareholder prerogatives, the court preserved abuse. While the
outcome of the Remillard Brick case could perhaps be justified on the
grounds that the directors demonstrated managerial ability,' 44 the
case nevertheless highlights the need to disregard corporate
democracy and the import of judicial review when interested
shareholders control the corporate election and removal process.
Courts should disregard shareholder decisions to prevent removal or
reelect directors when effected solely by the interested shareholders,
if the interests of the corporation call for removal.145
Because circumstances where controlling shareholders are
affected by divergence of interests present the opportunity for
recurring abuse, such situations may justify bars on reelection of
guilty directors. In Atkins v. Hughes, the court found directors guilty
of "fraud so apparent and manifest that it is unnecessary to go into
any lengthy details.., for so holding." 46 The two directors passed on
to the corporation the construction costs for the water facilities for
the private use of only two shareholders and misappropriated other
140. Id. at 77.
141. See id.
142. See id. at 68. This minority shareholder was the plaintiff in the case.
143. See i at 77.
144. Id at 76. For a description of the issue, see supra notes 58-59 and accompanying
text.
145. Such cases should parallel the review of decisions of the board of directors that are
tainted by conflicts of interest. See infra note 262 and accompanying text.
146. 282 P. 787,790 (Cal. 1929). For details, see supra notes 118-120 and accompanying
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funds from the company.147 The court found more than a divergence
of interests with respect to the two shareholders: it found a conspiracy
between these shareholders and directors to take advantage of the
corporation. 48 In these circumstances, removing these directors and
barring their reelection appear to be not only appropriate, but
necessary. However, while the trial court ordered the removal of the
directors, it did not impose a bar on their reelection.149 Apparently,
the same two shareholders continued to reelect the same two
directors (one of whom was himself one of these shareholders and the
other of whom was fully dominated by them) annually.150
The effect of divergence of interests impairment can still be
cured if a majority of the shareholders that are not affected by
divergence of interests impairment affirmatively decide, in accord
with the interested shareholders, to retain or re-elect the misbehaving
director. In this situation, a court's interference in internal corporate
affairs by removing a director would be inappropriate.15'
147. See id. at 789-90.
148. See id at 789.
149. See id. at 787.
150. This follows from the appellate decision stating that because the defendant
directors had been reelected twice, the removal issue became moot. See id. The court also
noted that "being the owners of a majority of the capital stock, [the directors] were able to
control the election of the board of directors." Id. at 790.
151. If the effect of the divergence of interests impairment can be cured before a
judicial decision, in theory it could also be cured after such a decision, if disinterested
shareholders later decide to reelect the director. Removal rules perhaps should take this
possibility into account. For example, a court could prohibit counting the interested
shareholder's vote to reelect the subject director (who was proven guilty of misbehavior),
but stop short of an outright and absolute bar on reelecting him. To be effective, such a
prohibition would need to be crafted to anticipate the possibility that the interested
shareholder could transfer its shares to an equally-interested affiliate or another entity
under its control. Otherwise, the outright bar on re-election has the benefit of being more
difficult to circumvent. Such a bar could still be evaded if a shareholder who was
previously in conspiracy with the misbehaving director would simply elect another
misbehaving director. This scenario, however, assumes the unlimited supply of potential
directors willing to engage in abuse. The removal remedy is certainly not designed to deal
with organized crime. Outside this context, however, the possibility of a mischievous
shareholder finding another director-wrongdoer, while conceivable, should not be taken
for granted. Finding another director-wrongdoer is generally more difficult than using an
affiliate dominated by the same shareholder, since only an individual could be a director,
while an affiliate may be an alter ego of the same shareholder. Theoretically, the most
effective remedy would probably be directed at the shareholder rather than only at the
director and might involve a prohibition on the exercise of voting rights by the particular
shareholder and his affiliates. Such a wide prohibition, however, would be a drastic
remedy perhaps amounting to an expropriation.
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(3) "Procedural Impairment" to Removal by Shareholders
Shareholder failure to remove a culpable director does not
necessarily reflect an affirmative desire of the shareholders to retain
such a director. Rather, stockholders may sometimes be procedurally
handicapped from removing a director, even in the absence of an
interested shareholder who controls the voting.
The Official Comment to the Model Act gives the following
example of a situation calling for a removal remedy:
In a publicly held corporation, the director charged with
misconduct declines to resign, though urged to do so, and because
of the large number of widely scattered shareholders, a special
shareholders' meeting can be held only after a period of delay and
at considerable expense. 52
A recent New York case, Management Technologies, Inc. v.
Morris,153 illustrates this situation. Management Technologies, Inc. is
a public corporation whose shares are traded on NASDAQ. Two of
the directors allegedly were trying to put the company's offshore
subsidiaries into bankruptcy in order to purchase their assets
themselves at a discount 54 Apparently, shareholders could not
promptly remove these directors because the shareholders' meeting
could not be scheduled immediately. 5 5 The court did not remove the
directors due to the deficiency of the statutory provision.156 In
another case, California Fruit Growers' Ass'n v. Superior Court,1 7
plaintiff shareholders claimed that most of the corporation's stock
was fraudulently issued by the defendant directors. The court held
that the removal of the directors by the shareholders was
impracticable until the validity of the outstanding stock was
determined.158
152. MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. § 8.09 official cmt. (Supp. 1997).
153. Management Techs., Inc. v. Morris, 961 F. Supp. 640, 650 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). For
more details, see infra notes 159,257-59 and accompanying text.
154. Management Techs., 961 F. Supp. at 643.
155. See id. at 645.
156. See iL at 650. The court instead imposed an injunction restraining the directors
from taking certain specific actions. See icL at 652.
157. California Fruit Growers' Ass'n v. Superior Court, 97 P. 769 (Cal. Ct. App. 1908).
158. The court in California Fruit Growers held: "The facts alleged were such as to
develop the impracticability of effecting the removal.., for until the validity of the
outstanding stock was determined it would not be possible for the stockholders to correct
the evils through the provisions relating to the removal and election of directors." Id. at
770. While it is easy to see why it would be "impracticable" to effect removal until the
validity of the outstanding stock is determined, it is not clear whether the court's
statement that the removal "would not be possible" implies an unstated concern about the
situation where directors holding the stock (allegedly invalidly issued) would have the
ability to prevent their own removal. If so, the case should fall instead into the
"divergence of interests impairment" category, since a possible subsequent determination
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These examples demonstrate that even if the democratic process
within a corporation is not necessarily flawed during the election, it
can be thwarted afterwards. This phenomenon may be called
"procedural impairment" to the removal of directors by shareholders.
A procedural impairment is caused by practical obstacles that are
beyond the shareholders' immediate control and that prevent them
from exercising their removal rights. Such an impairment constitutes
a classic "If I only could" situation.
In such instances, it may be preferable to allow the court to
second-guess the shareholders' preferences rather than allow
dishonest directors to continue to serve unchallenged. The courts
should draw a line separating "procedural impairment" from the
normal operation of a corporation. At one end of the spectrum,
procedural impairment could be said almost never to exist, absent
highly unusual circumstances. At the other end of the spectrum, it
could be said to exist in every public corporation whenever the annual
meeting is far in the future. In fact, the example offered by the
Official Comment to the Model Act seems to suggest such an
approach.159 While this approach may seem (and perhaps is) radical,
it is not as groundbreaking and paternalistic as it initially appears.
The law has long recognized the need for filling vacancies on the
that the outstanding stock was in fact validly issued would not cure such impairment to
removal. The court's decision in favor of appointment of a receiver ex parte may support
such a classification. See icL
159. MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. § 8.09 official cmt. (Supp. 1997); see also supra
note 106 and accompanying text. One may wonder whether a suit brought by a
shareholder could be resolved before the next shareholder meeting. However, lawmakers'
skepticism regarding the inefficiencies of the enforcement system should not be a ground
for flatly depriving a plaintiff of the opportunity to assess for himself the rapidity of
different methods of achieving the desired result, based on the particular circumstances.
Further, while the court may always dismiss a case if it becomes moot, it is not a given that
the procedural impairment will resolve itself before the court has time to act. Such an
action by a court does not necessarily have to be a final decision. The filing of a lawsuit
could provide a basis for a preliminary injunction suspending the director from performing
his duties. While the need for such injunctions has occurred in practice, in the absence of
a statutory authorization for removal, courts have been reluctant to grant injunctions
(including preliminary injunctions) that would be tantamount to removal. See, e.g.,
Management Techs., 961 F. Supp. at 640, 645 (granting a preliminary injunction restricting
the directors' authority in several respects on April 21, 1997, when the shareholders'
meeting was scheduled to take place on June 30, 1997, but refusing to remove the director
or to grant a broader preliminary injunction due to the lack of statutory authorization for
judicial removal). For a description of the case, see infra notes 257-59 and accompanying
text. See also supra notes 93-95 and accompanying text.
The concern that the issue may become moot is not present in the divergence of
interests impairment scenarios, because even if a director has been reelected before the
court is able to consider the dispute, such a reelection should not prevent the director's
subsequent removal and the imposition of a bar on his reelection.
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board of directors to avoid the expense of a special shareholders'
meeting.160
Unlike "divergence of interests impairment," "procedural
impairment" constitutes an impediment to the operation, rather than
the substance, of corporate democracy, and as such is a more
temporary phenomenon. Within one corporation, it may exist half a
year before an annual meeting, but may attenuate as the meeting
approaches. Thus, the corporate election process deserves greater
respect in "procedural impairment" situations than in those of
"divergence of interests impairment" and should prevail more often
over judicial desire to determine independently what constitutes the
best interests of the corporation.
Procedural impairment can be cured by the affirmative action of
the shareholders. The reelection or retention of a director by
shareholders who are apprised of the director's misbehavior should
preclude judicial interference. Unlike divergence of interests
impairment scenarios, a bar on reelection is unjustified in procedural
impairment situations.
C. Weighing the Interest of the Market (Third Fundamental Interest)
Against the Interests of a Corporation and the Inherent Rights of Its
Owners
Le poids ne se sent fort que dans la balance.
-MALCOLM DE CHAZAL 161
(1) Deterrence in Its Own Right
The interests of the corporation and those of the market are the
two possible rival motivations for the judicial removal of directors.162
While removal to uphold the interests of the corporation is conducive
to market-related interests, removal to pursue solely the interests of
the market, on the contrary, presents a significant threat to the
interests of the corporation. The tension between these two goals is
best illustrated by the following question: Are there policy reasons to
remove a director even in disregard of the corporation's best
interests? The answer to this question may have a significant impact
on the analysis of the removal remedy. If the interests of the market
are sufficiently compelling to justify removal, perhaps neither
160. See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 705(a).
161. "The weight's heft is proven upon the scale." Malcolm de Chazal, Poemes, in
LAROUSSE DES CITATIONS FRANAISES ET ETRANGPRES 127 (1976).
162. The interests of corporations other than the one where removal takes place and of
investors in such corporations are subsumed under the term "the interests of the market"
for purposes of this discussion.
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shareholders nor the board should have a say in removal proceedings,
because neither group could be expected to act willingly contrary to
its own and the corporation's interests in order to support a broader
policy goal.
Indeed, shareholders do not have a say in every judicial action
that may affect their voting rights. The removal remedy does not
exist in a remedial vacuum. Other remedies enable courts to
eliminate directors for different types of misconduct offending public
policy, such as remedies targeting violations of securities laws, tax
fraud or other crime.163 The "elimination" itself may take different
forms, from removal or even a permanent bar from occupying
managerial positions at any public company to imprisonment. 64 In
such instances, interests outside the corporation (such as interests of
the state or the securities market) have been infringed upon, the
action is usually initiated by a governmental agency, and shareholders
must simply accept the consequences of the action in pursuit of a
public goal.165
By contrast, the removal remedy discussed in this article is
designed to address misbehavior "with respect to the corporation,"' 66
that is, wrongdoing from which only the corporation at issue and its
shareholders as a group suffer, rather than the market, the
environment or society in general.167 Such a removal remedy is a
163. See supra note 102.
164. Id.
165. This was the rationale underlying the Remedies Act, which was designed to
protect the interests of the market and shareholders in general, rather than only a
particular corporation and its shareholders. The scenario where shareholders benefit from
a director's wrongdoing was advanced as one of the justifications in support of the director
removal and bar in the context of the Remedies Act. See Callcott, supra note 73, at 357,
370 (discussing, and disagreeing with, the Senate Report on the Remedies Act, S. Rep. No.
101-337, at 21 (1990)).
166. MODELBus. CORP. ACTANN. § 8.09(a)(1) (Supp. 1997).
167. One might argue that the corporation's creditors, employees or other parties could
be hurt by directorial misbehavior, and that such misbehavior may therefore become a
public policy concern. However, such arguments would refer to a different wrong inflicted
upon such parties directly rather than upon the corporation, and thus to a separate, even if
similar, remedy. One might also argue that, in light of the trend in corporate law to
recognize that the corporation's creditors, employees and others (collectively termed
"other corporate constituencies") have a certain stake in corporate well-being, such
parties should have a right to initiate removal actions. For a description of the "other
corporate constituencies" phenomenon, see infra note 237. However, such other
corporate constituencies do not have the right to participate in corporate governance by
the traditional means of voting to elect and remove directors. Nor are they allowed to
bring derivative actions on behalf of the corporation, whether against directors or
otherwise. Their special interests are protected by different remedies (for example,
fraudulent conveyance statutes and preferences in bankruptcy). Thus, overemphasizing
the rights of such other corporate constituencies in the context of a removal action is
unwarranted.
[Vol. 50
product of corporate, rather than securities, environmental or other
law. Accordingly, the award of the removal remedy logically should
only benefit the corporation and its shareholders. 168
Were the imposition of the removal remedy notwithstanding the
interests of the corporation also to have a significant positive impact
on the market, however, the removal remedy could perhaps mutate
from a remedy for the benefit of a particular victim corporation to a
remedy designed to serve a broader public goal of upholding the
interests of the market. The latter remedy would then be indifferent
to the interests of the particular corporation.
The interests of the market must be identified before they can be
pursued. An argument could be advanced that removing a
misbehaving director would promote investors' confidence in the
integrity of the market, even if such removal harms the corporation
itself.169 This could be a valid reason only if the retention of
misbehaving directors, when dictated by the corporation's interests
and consistent with the shareholders' will, would nevertheless be
disturbing for investors in the market. However, rational investors
may perceive removal as a double-edged sword and weigh the
obscure benefits of policing corporations in general against the
drawbacks of judicial infringement upon the investors' voting rights in
corporations in which they have invested and upon the interests of
such corporations.170 As a result of such a calculation, investors
would be more likely to resent, rather than welcome, judicial removal
of a director where the interests of the corporation require his
retention, unless such removal offers tangible benefits to the investors
in the way of deterrence. Thus, the application of the removal
remedy notwithstanding the interests of the corporation may
undermine, rather than support, investors' confidence in the
market.171
168. In addition, relying on plaintiff shareholders as private attorneys general to guard
the interests of the market while injuring their own corporation may present a serious
collusive settlement problem similar to the one widely observed in the context of
derivative actions. See infra notes 204-06 and accompanying text.
169. A rationale for supporting investors' confidence in the integrity of the market was
stated in the ALI Principles with respect to derivative actions. See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra
note 6, § 7.10 cmt. d. For an overview and critical discussion of the arguments leading to
the adoption of such a public policy rationale in the ALI Principles, see MICHAEL P.
DOOLEY, FUNDAMENTALS OF CORPORATION LAW 346-49 (1995).
170. See supra Part II.B.
171. While punishment of wrongdoers might be seen as another possible reason for
removing directors, this reason has been largely avoided outside the province of criminal
law. For the rejection of punishment as one of the justifications for punitive damages in
tort cases, see Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., Augmented Awards: The Efficient Evolution of
Punitive Damages, 51 LA. L. REv. 3 (1990). For the distinction between the objectives of
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Deterrence of directorial misconduct is a more concrete potential
interest of the market, and the one that has been advocated in the
context of derivative actions. Proponents of the deterrent function of
derivative actions justify pursuing such actions for deterrent purposes
even where the action involves a net loss to the corporation. 7 2 They
draw analogies between the deterrent purpose of criminal law and
that of a derivative action to support a conclusion that the interests of
the corporation are not paramount in a derivative action,7 3 while
critics of this approach accuse its proponents of unjustifiably assuming
that corporations have no internal mechanism to deter
misbehavior, 74 or characterize the pursuit of deterrence as the
imposition of a "litigation tax" on the corporation. 75 This Section
will review the merits of deterrence as a possible objective of the
removal remedy and will conclude that because the deterrent effect of
the removal remedy is in all probability low and in any event
unproven, the deterrent goal should not trump the interests of the
corporation or the prerogatives of its shareholders.
In order to draw a meaningful distinction between the concepts
of the interests of the corporation and deterrence, it is necessary to
differentiate between deterrence in its general sense, where misdeeds
are deterred in corporations on an industry or market level, and a
more restrictive sense, where directorial misbehavior is deterred in
the corporation where the removal remedy is sought. Indeed, the
latter, more narrow type of deterrence can be subsumed under the
"interests of the corporation" concept, because deterrence within the
deterrence and punishment, see Gary T. Schwartz, Deterrence and Punishment in the
Common Law of Punitive Damages: A Comment, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 133 (1982).
172. See John C. Coffee, Jr. & Donald E. Schwartz, The Survival of the Derivative Suit:
An Evaluation and a Proposal for Legislative Reform, 81 COLuM. L. REV. 261, 286-87
(1981); Coffee, supra note 97, at 263. But see Michael P. Dooley & E. Norman Veasey,
The Role of the Board in Derivative Litigation: Delaware Law and the Current ALl
Proposals Compared, 44 Bus. LAW. 503, 539-40 (1989). A net loss occurs when the
corporation's direct and indirect litigation costs exceed the benefits to the corporation in
whose name the action is brought. Because litigation costs in such actions are paid by the
corporation, these costs are a benchmark against which the benefits to the corporation are
assessed. Since plaintiffs in derivative actions usually seek the recovery of damages or
disgorgement of profits, possible recovery is easily measurable and allows a comparison
with expected litigation costs for purposes of determining whether pursuing the action
would be in the interests of the corporation. For an interesting proposal for reform
suggesting that a more important role be given to the corporation's interests in derivative
suits, see Reinier Kraakman et al., When Are Shareholder Suits in Shareholder Interests?,
82 GEO. L.J. 1733 (1994).
173. See Coffee, supra note 97, at 263.
174. See Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL.
ECON. 288 (1980) (arguing that most monitoring takes place internally by the board and
by management itself).
175. See Dooley & Veasey, supra note 172, at 539.
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corporation is generally in the corporation's best interests. 7 6 In
contrast, deterrence in the abstract sense could be pursued
independently of the corporation's interests and even to the
detriment of such interests,177 for example by removing a director
176. The court in Markovitz v. Markovitz removed a director in order to improve the
atmosphere in the company (interests of the corporation) and deter the defendant from
misbehavior if ever elected again as a director of the same company (essentially also in the
interests of the corporation). "[The period of the bar] will undoubtedly afford a
reasonable time for the existing friction and dissention to disappear, and will serve as a
warning that a repetition of such misconduct, while acting as a director of the corporation,
may afford in the future grounds for further disqualification to hold the office."
Markovitz v. Markovitz, 8 A.2d 46,48 (Pa. 1939).
177. The proponents of the deterrence objective of derivative actions argue that the
goal of deterrence should trump the interests of the corporation. See supra notes 172-173
and accompanying text.
Courts have sometimes favored public policy objectives to the detriment of the
interests of the corporation in certain specific circumstances related to derivative actions.
Such circumstances, however, are only marginally, if at all, relevant to removal actions.
For example, a public policy rationale was allowed to prevail over the interests of the
corporation in narrow circumstances where the majority of the board was interested in a
transaction ("demand excused" situations) in a test set forth in Zapata Corp. v.
Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981). The court in Zapata established the principle that
in certain circumstances, courts may look beyond the board's decision and apply a public
policy analysis to decide whether to pursue a derivative claim. I& at 789. In Zapata, an
independent committee of the board followed all the procedures prescribed by law and
determined that the pursuit of the derivative litigation at issue would not be in the best
interests of the corporation. I& at 781. The court established a two-prong test. The first
prong requires an inquiry into the independence and good faith of the committee and the
bases supporting its conclusions. If the court is satisfied that the committee's decision was
taken appropriately, it may proceed to the second prong and apply its own business
judgment as to whether to dismiss the case. See id. at 789. In doing so, the court may
consider matters of law and public policy in addition to the corporation's best interests,
and balance legitimate corporate claims as expressed in a shareholder suit against the
corporation's interest as expressed in the findings of the committee. See id. at 788-89.
While the court does not specifically list deterrence as an appropriate matter of public
policy, one may expect that it would qualify as such. Some commentators have viewed
Zapata as one of the decisions recognizing the deterrent impact of derivative action. See
Alex Elson & Michael L. Shakman, The ALl Principles of Corporate Governance: A
Tainted Process and a Flawed Product, 49 Bus. LAW. 1761, 1789 (1994). The Zapata case,
however, is inapplicable to removal actions in general because it applies solely to narrow
"demand excused" situations.
Another example where a shareholder action advancing a policy objective has been
permitted to proceed in disregard of the interests of the corporation is found in early court
decisions addressing specific instances of criminal violations by a corporation. Such
decisions granted relief even when the criminal conduct was not contrary to the interests
of the corporation. For example, in Roth v. Abrams, an amusement park bribed
individuals who threatened to prevent the park from operating in violation of state Sunday
closing laws. 118 N.Y.S. 351 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1909). Although the park benefited from this
arrangement, the court upheld judgment against the park on the grounds that the bribe
not only violated a criminal statute, but affronted the business community's moral
standards. See id at 353. In another case, Abrams v. Allen, the court suggested that in a
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who once has succumbed to an improper temptation and caused an
insignificant harm to the corporation, but who over the course of his
tenure has benefited the corporation overall. 178 Therefore, this
Section will discuss deterrence in its broad sense only.
(2) Deterrence Formula
Any consideration of whether a deterrent rationale can support a
removal action will depend on the effectiveness of such an action as a
deterrent. 179 No empirical studies are available to show the deterrent
effect of removal actions. However, studies that have been conducted
in the context of derivative litigation, which also often addresses
directorial misbehavior, show that the deterrent effect of shareholder
actions is difficult to ascertain.18 0 Some commentators highlight
methodological and statistical barriers to collecting relevant evidence,
acknowledging that the known data fail to measure the deterrent
value of derivative suits.' 81  The proponents of the deterrence
case where a corporation dismantled and removed its plants to punish employee efforts to
organize unions, illegal conduct alone would be sufficient to find its perpetrator liable. 74
N.E.2d 305, 306 (N.Y. 1947). Under the prevailing rule today, however, a plaintiff in a
derivative suit must establish not only that a knowing criminal act caused an economic loss
to the corporation, but also that the resulting loss exceeded the competitive benefits
gained through the violation. See generally James D. Cox, Compensation, Deterrence, and
the Market as Boundaries for Derivative Suit Procedures, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 745,
764-75 (1985) (criticizing the early cases for reflecting a philosophy that a deterrence
objective should predominate where a compensatory purpose is lacking). The preference
of courts for a public policy rationale in the criminal violation context does not apply to
removal actions. Assuming deviations from the modern "benefits to the corporation" rule
may be justified on the basis that shareholders themselves should not benefit from illegal
activity, this justification is absent in a removal case because the basis for judicial removal
at the request of a shareholder is misbehavior with respect to the corporation, from which
misbehavior shareholders presumably suffer rather than benefit.
178. For the details of this example, see supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
179. Other areas of law, especially those contemplating liability, call for similar
inquiries. See, e.g., Mark F. Grady, A New Positive Economic Theory of Negligence, 92
YALE L.J. 799, 800 (1983) (stating that the positive theory must ascertain which liability
rules minimize social cost and whether the actual liability rules that courts employ do so).
180. The two most sophisticated and famous studies on the empirical effects of
derivative suits on corporate performance have been conducted by Professors Fischel and
Bradley and, more recently, by Professor Roberta Romano. See Roberta Romano, The
Shareholder Suit: Litigation Without Foundation?, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 55 (1991)
(challenging the assumption that shareholder derivative suits have a deterrent effect);
Daniel R. Fischel & Michael Bradley, The Role of Liability Rules and the Derivative Suit in
Corporate Law: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 71 CORNELL L. REv. 261 (1986).
181. For a discussion, see Larry E. Ribstein, Edited Transcript of Proceedings of the
Business Roundtable/Emory University Law and Economics Center Conference on
Remedies under the ALI Proposals: Law and Economics, 71 CORNELL L. REv. 357,373-81
(1986). Also, according to Professor Demsetz:
Stock prices should fall when a court dismisses a derivative suit if such dismissals
cause investors to revise their earnings expectations downward. However, the
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objective of derivative actions admit that deterrence is difficult to
assess,182 but argue that the fact that the deterrent effect cannot be
proven by empirical evidence does not mean it does not exist. Their
opponents counter that if the deterrence effect cannot be proven, the
law should not assume its existence. 83 In the absence of empirical
evidence showing the effectiveness of the removal remedy as a
deterrent, a theoretical examination of the issue is warranted.
In order to analyze the deterrent effect of removal actions, the
components of deterrence must be identified. In general, the
deterrent effect of a legal action depends on its ability to raise the cost
of the undesirable behavior to the defendant (that is, the "penalty,"
whatever form it takes) and the probability that the defendant will
have to incur this cost (that is, the probability that the defendant will
be caught, sued and forced to pay the penalty). This relationship can
be expressed algebraically as follows. GC ("general cost") is the cost
of the defendant's behavior to the plaintiff and other parties injured
by the behavior, DC ("defendant cost") is the cost of the behavior
imposed on the defendant, and P ("probability") is the probability
that the defendant will incur the defendant cost. To achieve an
optimal level of deterrence, the general cost of the defendant's
behavior should equal the cost imposed on the defendant multiplied
by the probability that the defendant will incur such cost:184
dismissal should not necessarily be linked to a downward revision in expected
earnings. The suit may be ill-founded, or it may be a nuisance suit, in which case
its dismissal may lead investors to revise their earnings expectations upward....
An assessment of the impact of the dismissal of a derivative suit on earnings
expectations is difficult to make absent some basis for judging the validity of the
suit.
Harold Demsetz, A Commentary on Liability Rules and the Derivative Suit in Corporate
Law, 71 CORNELL L. REv. 352,353-54 (1986).
182. See Coffee, supra note 97, at 263, 267-68.
183. See Dooley, supra note 32, at 509-12.
184. Variations of the same formula apply to other areas of law. Such deterrence
calculus with respect to criminal law was set forth in Gary S. Becker, Crime and
Punishment, An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169, 178-79 (the number of
offenses is a function of the probability of conviction per offense and the punishment per
offense; other factors were also mentioned). Professor Elliott points out swiftness as
another important factor increasing the deterrent effect of sanctions in criminal law. See
Elliott, supra note 97, at 1062-63 (1989) (referring to J. WILTON & R. HERRNSTEIN,
CRIME AND HUMAN NATURE 397-401 (1985)). With respect to efficient violations (such
as negligence), under Judge Hand's formula, the expected loss (probability of occurrence
times cost) should equal the cost of loss avoidance. See United States v. Carroll Towing
Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947). For an illustration of Judge Hand's formula, see
Dorsey D. Ellis, Jr., Fairness and Efficiency in the Law of Punitive Damages, 56 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1, 23-33 (1982).
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To the extent the product of "defendant cost" multiplied by
"probability" is lower than "general cost," underdeterrence will
occur. Conversely, overdeterrence will result if the product of this
multiplication exceeds "general cost."'1 86
(3) "P". the "Probability" Parameter of the Deterrence Formula
Detecting, catching, and convicting wrongdoers (or, using the
language of the deterrence formula, "imposing costs on the
defendant") is never an easy task. Judging from the experience of
derivative actions, this task is particularly difficult as applied to
violations of the duty of loyalty by corporate directors, in contrast to
lawsuits outside the ambit of corporate law. Removal actions face the
same obstacles.
It is a consequence of the separation of ownership and control in
a modem public corporation' 87 that wrongs done to the corporation
are more difficult to detect than those inflicted on victims in other
areas. As a rule, even a moderately alert owner, simply in the course
of "using" his property, is in a good position to notice damage to his
property without exerting any special effort. A victim of a traffic
accident or a crime can hardly ignore the effects of a collision or
battery. Shareholders, however, being remote from their "property,"
do not have occasion to "use" it and thus may never detect damage
185. For instance, if the cost of a director's misbehavior to the corporation is $1 million,
and the probability of the director being caught and penalized is 0.2 (1 chance out of 5),
then the penalty imposed on the director should be $5 million: $1,000,000 = 0.2 x
$5,000,000. Alternatively, the probability of deterrence could be raised to keep the $1
million balance.
186. The desirability of overdeterrence depends on whether or not the violation is
efficient. As applied to efficient violations (i.e., useful but hazardous activity),
overdeterrence is undesirable, since it causes actors to forego activities that have net social
benefits: for instance, if people are overdeterred from driving too fast, too frequently, and
too far, they may start driving too slowly, too infrequently, and not far enough. See David
D. Haddock et al., An Ordinary Economic Rationale for Extraordinary Legal Sanctions, 78
CAL. L. REV. 1, 8 (1990). Fraud and other gross misconduct by a director of a
corporation, however, is an inefficient violation. For such violations, it has been said that
"[ilf we are certain enough that some kinds of conduct are always inappropriate ... no
penalty is too high." FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCrURE OF CORPORATE LAW 323 (1991). The authors, however, suggest two caveats
for such a statement. First, the "if we are certain" portion of the statement must take into
account the possibility of mistakes made in ascertaining that it was the defendant who
committed the wrong. Second, the "no penalty is too high" portion may be an
overstatement since, if a small lie is punishable by a large penalty, the wrongdoer may be
inclined to tell a big lie instead. Id
187. See ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION
AND PRiVATE PROPERTY (1932).
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inflicted upon the corporation by its directors. 188 Efficient market
theory might suggest that stock price fluctuations would signal
potential violations by corporate directors. However, a decrease in
the price of the stock of a corporation may be attributable to a
number of factors unrelated to the honesty or aptitude of its directors.
A price decrease would form a poor pretext to call directors to
account from an economic perspective and an even less adequate
basis for a lawsuit from a legal standpoint.
Moreover, while the system of disclosure in U.S. companies is
rather comprehensive, 189 the realities of modem stock portfolio
ownership render a shareholder's knowledge of the affairs of any one
corporation impracticable and make ignorance efficient even as
applied to the reading of the materials for the annual shareholders'
meeting received by mail and necessary for voting.19° Since the desire
of stockholders in public companies to review the annals of the
corporation's management is doubtful even when those annals are
brought to them on a silver platter, they cannot be expected to
investigate vigorously possible violations by managers and directors.
In addition, the law itself limits the right of shareholders to inspect
corporate records, except for the most basic ones, by requiring a
showing of "reasonable purpose."'u9 The impediment to deterrence
in the form of a shareholders' "information deficiency" is magnified
by the existence of information asymmetry vis-a-vis management,
since "information efficient" wrongdoers, by virtue of their agency
position, are well-placed to perpetuate an abuse.1g2 The invisibility of
managerial abuse is the same whether the shareholder seeks removal
of a director or some other remedy.
Even if a management violation were to become known to
shareholders, they would be unlikely to bring an action. Most
shareholders' stakes in a given public corporation are comparatively
small, the "proceeds" for a shareholder seeking removal would be
188. The occasions when nobody knows about a violation lead to a phenomenon that
has been termed "recurring wrongs." See generally Saul Levmore, Probabilistic
Recoveries, Restitution, and Recurring Wrongs, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 691 (1990).
189. See generally Louis Lowenstein, Financial Transparency and Corporate
Governance: You Manage What You Measure, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1335 (1996).
190. See CLARK, supra note 128, §§ 9.5-9.5.3 at 389-94. Dean Clark describes three
systematic difficulties pertinent to shareholders' collective action: the "rational apathy
problem," the "free rider problem," and the "fairness problem." See also MELVIN ARON
EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION 18-29 (1976).
191. See, e.g., MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. § 16.02 (Supp. 1997).
192. For a discussion of information asymmetry, see Cox, supra note 177, at 747.
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subject to dilution, and the shareholders' impetus to bring suit against
a malfeasant director should be commensurate. 93
In addition, a shareholder's unlikely desire to bring a removal
action may be circumvented by hurdles the law has intentionally (and,
in many respects, justifiably) placed in the path of derivative lawsuits
mainly in order to preserve the authority of the board 94 and prevent
strike suits.195 These impediments include "security for expenses"
statutes,196 which require that a plaintiff post a bond for the payment
of a successful defendant's expenses, the demand requirement, 197
where a suit's merit must be decided by the board before the plaintiff
is allowed to proceed, the contemporaneous ownership rule,198 which
denies standing to sue to a plaintiff who was not a shareholder at the
time the alleged wrong was committed, and the right of the board to
dismiss derivative suits.199 Under current removal statutes, a removal
suit is free from these hurdles only if brought directly by a
shareholder owning over 10% of shares.2°° Besides the fact that the
probability factor of a removal action is not likely to skyrocket as a
result of suits brought by 10% shareholders, the 10% rule exists due
to arbitrary statutory language rather than any substantive reason and
could be (and should be) eliminated with the stroke of a pen.201
Furthermore, and in apparent contrast to the considerations
above, a successful plaintiff in a removal action (at least when
brought as a derivative claim) will receive attorney's fees from the
193. For a description of the deterrence problem where there is "slight harm to many,"
see Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., Augmented Awards: The Efficient Evolution of Punitive
Damages, 51 LA. L. REV. 3, 39 (1990). For a description of such problems in the context
of corporate law, and for original solutions, see Saul Levmore, Monitors and Freeriders in
Commercial and Corporate Settings, 92 YALE L.J. 49 (1982). For a description of
monitoring problems even on the part of institutional investors, see Mark J. Roe, A
Political Theory of American Corporate Finance, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 10 (1991).
194. The efficient management of the corporation demands freedom from the
interference of manifold shareholders. According to Professor Dooley, the rules are
designed to protect the authority of the board and thereby protect shareholders from
themselves. See Dooley, supra note 32, at 470. See also infra notes 273-76 and
accompanying text.
195. See infra note 249 and accompanying text.
196. Id.
197. See infra notes 260, 273 and accompanying text.
198. See, e.g., Gordon H. Pearce, Recent Developments in the California Law of
Shareholders' Derivative Suits, 1 UCLA L. REv. 79 (1953) (discussing the reasons for
adopting the contemporaneous ownership rule in California).
199. See infra note 266 and accompanying text.
200. See supra note 34, infra notes 244-46 and accompanying text.
201. See infra Part III.B for a discussion concluding that a removal suit brought by a
10% shareholder is a poor candidate for an unimpeded shareholder action.
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 50
JUDICIAL REMOVAL OF DIRECTORS
company.20 2 The prospect of receiving attorneys' fees gives an
incentive to attorneys to induce shareholders to bring suits and
removes the burden of litigation costs from the shoulders of the
plaintiff shareholder. 2 3 The derivative action would then seem to
have the built-in potential to enforce the underlying legal rights of the
corporation that the action seeks to redress. Unfortunately, however,
this system in practice tends to operate more as an encouragement to
bring frivolous suits and settle than as a brake on wrongdoing.2°4 The
enthusiasm of zealous litigation attorneys in this regard has been
frowned upon in legal academia. 2 5 Proponents of the deterrence
function of derivative actions view the problem of collusive
settlements as one of the main barriers preventing the derivative
action from serving as an effective deterrent.20 6
Admittedly, the above factors reducing the probability
parameter of the deterrence equation are mitigated in the context of a
close corporation. Unlike their counterparts in public corporations,
shareholders in close corporations are more inclined to defend the
interests of their corporation.20 7
However, an important factor reducing the probability of
deterrence is shared by the shareholders in both public and close
corporations. The removal remedy usually requires a showing of
fraud and deception, rather than the more objective standard of self-
dealing used in derivative actions for violation of the duty of
loyalty.208 It is generally recognized that the elements of fraud are
difficult to prove, and the need to assert fraud would discourage
202. Courts' treatment of removal actions for the purposes of awarding attorneys' fees
has not been consistent. See infra note 244.
203. Litigation costs are instead borne by the shareholders as a class.
204. According to an empirical study conducted by Professor Romano, out of 128
resolved shareholders' suits (both direct and derivative, involving almost twenty percent of
a randomly selected sample of over 500 public companies), 83 lawsuits settled. Only 11
derivative action settlements resulted in any monetary recovery, while attorneys' fees were
awarded in 90% of settled cases. See Romano, supra note 180, at 59-64.
205. See, e.g., Dooley, supra note 32, at 509-12.
206. See, e.g., Coffee & Schwartz, supra note 172, at 326-27.
207. Shareholders in close corporations usually have better information with respect to
the business of the corporation and a larger stake in it. In addition, they may be exempt
from the legal impediments to bringing such actions. See infra note 246.
208. See Tarin v. Pellonari, 625 N.E.2d 739 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993). The court held that the
elevated standard of clear and convincing evidence, rather than preponderance of the
evidence (the usual standard for self-dealing), should be used in removal actions. In
rejecting the plaintiff's claim that the directors should be removed because they engaged
in self-dealing, the court announced: "Whether or not the defendants have engaged in self-
dealing is not the relevant inquiry under this statute. The statute does not authorize the
[trial] court to remove directors who engage in self-dealing; instead, it requires the trial
court to find proof of fraud." L. at 748.
November 1998]
potential removal action plaintiffs and reduce the probability
parameter of the removal action even further.20 9
(4) "DC": the "Costs to Defendant" Parameter of the Deterrence Formula
Even with a low probability parameter, effective deterrence
could still be achieved if costs to the defendant were high. However,
this is not the case in removal actions. The relevant defendant costs
in an action against a director are financial penalties, damage to
reputation and social stigma.210 The financial loss imposed by a
successful removal action is limited to a loss of future director's fees.
Further, unlike disgorgement of profits, the removal remedy is
forward-looking and therefore the future loss of remuneration is
partially compensated by future relief from the responsibilities and
time commitment connected with directorship2 11 Moreover, because
most directors in public companies have a full-time occupation
outside the corporation and frequently hold directorships in several
companies,212 they do not rely on their positions as directors for
income.213
209. See, e.g., Ellis, supra note 184, at 25-26.
210. See Coffee, supra note 97, at 263; Elson & Shakman, supra note 177, at 1789.
211. This reasoning, however, has been rejected in a close corporation context by the
court in Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657 (Mass. 1976). The court
held that majority shareholders in a close corporation against whom a minority
shareholder brought action for breach of fiduciary duty when they removed him from his
directorship and from his position as a salaried officer could not claim that the minority
shareholder's damages should be diminished due to the fact that the majority shareholders
or their representatives performed duties which had previously been performed by the
minority shareholder. See id. at 664.
212. It has become a well-accepted practice in recent decades in public companies to
form the majority of the board from outside directors, who by definition do not hold
managerial positions in the corporation. The New York Stock Exchange and NASDAQ
require a minimum of two directors independent of management for listed companies.
The Corporate Director's Guidebook and the ALI Principles recommend that a majority
of the board should be comprised of independent directors. See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra
note 6, § 3A.01(a). See also W.F. Rockwell, Putting the Knowledge and Know-How of
Outside Directors to Work, in THE CORPORATE DIRECrOR, NEW ROLES AND
RESPONSIBILITIES 55 (1975).
213. This fact has caused fear that outside directors may simply be reluctant to serve as
directors and has often been advanced as an argument in favor of limitation on liability of
outside directors. See, e.g., Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Divergence of Standards of
Conduct and Standards of Review in Corporate Law, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 437, 445
(1993). For an example of how easily outside directors resign and a relevant discussion,
see Alfred F. Conard, The Supervision of Corporate Management. A Comparison of
Developments in European Community and United States Law, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1459,
1472-75 (1984).
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In a close corporation, directorial fees might constitute a greater
source of income for a shareholder-director,21 4 and the cost of
removal could be higher for such a director. However, the cost to the
defendant in removal actions involving both public and close
corporations is limited by current corporate statutes, which do not
grant courts the right to bar directors from occupying similar
positions in other companies or different positions in the company
from which they have been removed. Such a "universal bar" does
exist in federal law, under which plaintiff government agencies such
as the Securities and Exchange Commission may seek to bar
individuals for life or for a definite period of time from officerships
and directorships in public companies for serious violations of
legislation they are charged with enforcing.215
(5) Frustration of the Deterrence Equation
As demonstrated above, both the defendant cost and probability
parameters of the deterrence equation are low in a removal action.
Because both parameters are low, their product is too low to create a
significant deterrent effect on directorial wrongdoing. Our
deterrence equation in this case becomes an inequality:
GC>PxDC
While this low level of deterrence is certainly regrettable on its
face, it invites an inquiry into whether strengthening the right side of
the inequality is justified.
By itself, an increase in the probability that a defendant will bear
the costs associated with removal could have perverse results. If
removal were perceived as a penalty that is not very costly, but
frequent or easy to impose, a rational but dishonest director might
believe that any misdeed, great or small, will lead to dismissal sooner
or later. Therefore, such a director might be inclined to take
advantage of an opportunity for quick enrichment and in general seek
to derive as much profit as possible in his limited time at the
214. The consequences to a director might be more severe if he serves as both a
director and officer of a single close corporation, and if his removal as a director also leads
to his dismissal as an officer.
215. See Morris, supra note 102 (discussing the Remedies Act); Basil, supra note 102
(discussing FIRREA). The deterrent effect of the universal permanent bar was made
clear by Judge Timbers in the famous Posner case: "The Posners seem to be shocked by
what they see as the draconian remedy of eternal boardroom banishment. We intend our
affirmance of Judge Pollack's judgment in this respect as a sharp warning to those who
violate the securities laws that they face precisely such banishment." SEC v. Posner, 16
F.3d 520,522 (2d Cir. 1994).
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corporate trough, rather than hope for a longer tenure of more
subdued wrongdoing.216
Even if this scenario of rational corporate piracy were not borne
out, mathematics teaches that if any quantity is multiplied by zero, the
result is also zero, no matter how large the first number is.
Accordingly, where the cost to the defendant is very small, as in the
case of current removal statutes, efforts to increase the probability of
successful removals will need to be colossal in order to achieve a
meaningful level of deterrence. Yet because reinforcing the
probability parameter by removing key and competent directors
harms the corporation, zeal in such reinforcement is not appropriate.
An increase in the cost of removal to the defendant is another
avenue for increasing the deterrent effect of the removal remedy.
However, such a path is controversial in itself. It has been proposed
that where the probability of imposing defendant cost is inherently
low, higher penalties for violations are justified.217 "Higher penalties"
in the removal context are bound to emulate federal precedent and
take the form of industry-wide bars, whether permanent or
temporary. Yet these measures have been called "draconian" by both
the defendant bar and the courts, and should therefore not be enacted
lightly.218 This is especially true in light of the fact that the removal
remedy, even in its current form, is relatively new and insufficiently
tested, and enhancing it with an industry-wide bar would be
premature.219 In addition, in cases of the most outrageous one-time
violations, the deterrent effect of removal and bar may be completely
undermined by the defendant's indifference to such penalties, even
the highest ones.220
216. This is a mirror reflection of a behavioral pattern with respect to large penalties.
As Professors Easterbrook and Fischel presented it, if a small lie is punishable by a large
penalty, then this would encourage a big lie to be made too. See EASTERBROOK &
FISCHEL, supra note 186, at 323.
217. For such a suggestion within the framework of corporate law, see Bernard Black
and Reinier Kraakman, A Self-Enforcing Model of Corporate Law, 109 HARV. L. REV.
1911, 1972 (1996). The authors proposed introducing higher sanctions in emerging
markets where enforcement is inherently low; however, due to other considerations, the
authors did not include high penalties in the Russian Joint Stock Company Law that they
drafted.
218. See supra note 215. Interestingly, parity with shareholders' removal rights was
suggested as an argument for granting the Securities and Exchange Commission removal
rights in the context of the Remedies Act. See Barnard, supra note 11, at 51. The same
parity argument might be used to justify granting courts powers to impose a "universal
bar" on directorships and officerships for misconduct with respect to a corporation at a
shareholder's request.
219. For a powerful criticism of "universal bar" powers of the SEC under the Remedies
Act, see Barnard, supra note 11, at 53-68.
220. It has been recognized that directors and officers who have a chance to achieve
unprecedented wealth through a single misdeed have less concern for their continued
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Because each instance of removal solely in pursuit of deterrence
entails sacrificing the interests of the corporation, two factors need to
be proven before a significant increase in the use of such a remedy
solely to achieve deterrence would be warranted. First, compelling
evidence would need to be shown that the removal action, armed with
a deterrence goal, will indeed materially increase the deterrence of
managerial violations.222 No empirical evidence has proven such a
deterrent effect. The above theoretical analysis demonstrates that
such an effect is at best uncertain in the removal action.
While the deterrent effect of directorial removal in a close
corporation may be higher than in a public corporation, its benefits
do not necessarily outweigh its harm to the interests of a particular
corporation. Indeed, the very reason the removal remedy may have a
greater deterrent effect in close corporations is also responsible for
depriving shareholders in such corporations of the benefits of
deterrence. The reason for a possibly higher deterrent effect in close
corporations is that shareholders typically hold a large stake in a
particular close corporation and therefore have a greater interest in
monitoring the corporation and pursuing litigation to remedy
perceived wrongdoing. This type of shareholding is exclusive-
shareholders do not hold a diversified portfolio of shares in close
corporations (and to the extent they do, or to the extent shareholders
in close corporations also hold shares of public corporations, they
should be viewed as shareholders in public corporations for purposes
of the deterrence analysis, since such diversification would reduce
their interest in monitoring any specific corporation).
According to advocates of deterrence, the major benefit of
disregarding the interests of the corporation in favor of deterrence is
based on the phenomenon of diversification. These scholars argue
that because shareholders typically hold diversified portfolios of stock
in several companies, they benefit from a derivative action that deters
potential wrongdoers at other companies even if the action involves a
net loss to the particular corporation at issue.222 Shareholders in close
affiliation with the firm that provided them with such a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity.
See Cox, supra note 177, at 753-54. In general, market controls for corporate managers
(such as the employment market, including the threat of a shift in corporate control) may
be inadequate to deal with one-time defalcations, when the agent concludes that the
opportunities of the moment exceed any subsequent penalties in the employment market.
See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 64, at 701.
221. A similar call with respect to derivative actions was made by Professor Cox. See
Cox, supra note 177, at 782-83.
222. See Coffee, supra note 97, at 263. The second principal argument in support of the
deterrence objective is related to the failure of the compensatory function of the
derivative action and is equally inapplicable to close corporations. According to advocates
of the deterrence goal, derivative actions may be seen to provide inadequate
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corporations, however, do not benefit from diversification. Rather
than enjoying the benefit of litigation having a small cost relative to
their investment but a salutary effect on the sizeable remainder of
their holdings, such shareholders instead run the risk of seeing the
large part of their investment consumed in an action that harms the
interests of their corporation for the putative benefit of deterring
misconduct elsewhere. Moreover, shareholders in public
corporations, who are typically diversified, would not enjoy the
deterrent effect spurred by removal litigation in close corporations
because, as discussed above, such litigation is less frequent and less
threatening to directors in public corporations, and therefore is
unlikely to deter misconduct there.
Further, before the removal remedy could be used solely to
achieve deterrence, it would need to be shown that the other
remedies that have a higher or similar deterrent potential, but do not
have the same detrimental effect on the interests of the corporation,
are unavailable or insufficient. A traditional derivative action for
breach of the director's duty of loyalty may be such a remedy. It has
a higher probability of imposing the costs on defendant directors
because the standard of proof is lower in such an action.223 It might
also have a similar or higher potential for increasing the severity of
the "penalty" imposed on directors.224 Most importantly, the interests
of the corporation would suffer less when a director whose continued
affiliation with the corporation would be beneficial to it pays damages
to the corporation than when such a director is instead removed.225
compensation to the corporation because (i) the constant change in the corporation's
ownership makes it impossible to assess who is harmed and how much, and therefore to
determine adequate compensation, (ii) loss to the corporation is different from loss to its
shareholders, in that market fear of the repetition of a misdeed may impact the
corporation's stock price in a way that will harm shareholders to a greater extent than the
mere economic loss to the corporation stemming from the misdeed itself, and (iii) the
large number of stockholders in a typical corporation means that any individual
shareholder's compensation will be de minimis. See Coffee & Schwartz, supra note 172, at
302-10. The authors conclude that "the fiction of compensation serves the reality of
deterrence." Id at 303.
223. See supra Part II.B.3.
224. See supra Part II.B.4.
225. Even when a director pays damages to the corporation, a derivative action might
not be in the interests of the corporation if the litigation fees are higher than the amount
of damages paid as a result of a successful derivative action. See supra note 172 and
accompanying text. However, litigation fees are likely to be even higher in a removal
action, due to the higher standard of proof. See supra notes 208-09 and accompanying
text. Most importantly, when removal is pursued against the interests of the corporation,
the "remedy" by definition is harmful to the corporation.
It may be argued that if the removal action increases the chances of revealing
directors' misbehavior, it would increase the chances for the return of profits from the
wrongdoers and collection of damages from them accordingly. In that case, however, the
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Since the showing of a substantial deterrent effect is absent in a
removal action and a deterrent less harmful to the interests of the
corporation may be available, invoking public policy arguments to
justify removal where it is not beneficial to the corporation may do
more harm than good.
The above analysis underlines the significance and
appropriateness of selecting the interests of the corporation as a
condition to removal by the Model Act and other removal statutes.
There are other "removal" remedies outside the context of corporate
law which are specifically designed to eliminate directors in order to
achieve specific policy goals.22 6 However, absent a clearly defined
public policy goal that would be well served by the judicial removal
remedy, a corporate law remedy designed to protect a corporation
should not be modified so as to injure it.
III. Practical Realization of the Removal Remedy: When Two
Cooks in the Kitchen Are Better than One
A. Protecting Shareholders' Prerogative: Court over Board
(1) Board as a Candidate to Effect Removal
When the removal of directors is sought in the interests of the
corporation, there are two possible "candidates" to effect such a
removal besides the shareholders: the board of directors and the
court. In deciding between the two candidates, arguments could be
made that if the goal of the removal remedy is the "prompt and
efficient elimination of dishonest directors," 227 the board would
obviously be in a position to remove directors faster and at less
expense than the court. Furthermore, the board is entrusted with
pursuing the interests of the corporation, and removing a
misbehaving director in order to protect such corporate interests
conforms with that mission.
Generally, the board of directors does not have the right to
remove its members even for cause.2 - Some states, however,
empower the board to remove a director who is of unsound mind or
meets other specified conditions.229 Further, a handful of states do
law should build mechanisms to encourage the latter suits directly, and not through the
back door of the removal action.
226. See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
227. This is the objective set forth in the Official Comment to the Model Act. See
MODEL BUS. CORP. Acr ANN. § 8.09 official cmt. (Supp. 1997).
228. See MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. § 8.08 Statutory Comparison (Supp. 1997).
229. California, North Carolina, Ohio and Pennsylvania statutes contain such
provisions. See id.
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indeed empower the board to remove a director for the same
misconduct that triggers a judicial removal remedy, without the need
for judicial intervention.2 30 This Section will argue that the removal
of its own members by the board (as opposed to the board's right to
initiate or dismiss removal proceedings) is inappropriate, and the
removal power should be left to the courts instead.
(2) Danger of Redistribution of Powers Within a Corporation
Granting the board the right to remove its own members would
alter the balance of powers in the corporation on two levels.
One level involves the correlation between the authority of the
shareholders and that of the board of directors. The system of
separation of powers, initially devised by the founding fathers of
representative democracy231 and widely accepted in the modem
world, is replicated in a modern corporation. Usurpation by the
board of the shareholder prerogative to remove directors is not
consistent with this principle of separation of powers 32 The danger
of violating this principle is exacerbated by the fact that the board of
directors already has powers to appoint directors to fill vacancies on
the board.233
On another level, unlike most other types of corporate litigation,
the outcome of a removal action may change dramatically the balance
of powers not only between the shareholders and the board, but also
among shareholders. This result occurs because directors are
shareholders' representatives, and a removal decision may destroy the
equilibrium between majority and minority representatives on the
board. The current powers of the board to fill vacancies enhance the
possibility of a power shift at this shareholder-shareholder level, in
addition to the shareholder-board level. The judiciary has pointed
out the danger of the redistribution of powers within a corporation
resulting from a removal action.234 This danger may stem from the
230. For example, Massachusetts and Missouri statutes contain such provisions. See id.
231. See generally 1 MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS 8-13 (Thomas Nugent trans.,
Colonial Press 1899) (1748).
232. The court in Bruch v. National Guarantee Credit Corp., 116 A. 738,742 (Del. Ch.
1922) held that the various powers that a corporation may exercise are distributed among
the directors, officers and shareholders, and the power to remove a director rests with the
shareholders and not the board. See also supra note 127. For a discussion of shareholders'
inherent right to remove directors, see Part II.A.
233. See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 705.
234. The court in Laughlin v. Geer, 121 Ill. App. 534 (Ill. App. Ct. 1905) reasoned that
if the board could remove a director for disloyalty, then a power dangerous to the minority
shareholders would be lodged with the majority shareholders which would enable them,
through action of the directors chosen by them, to reconstitute the board of directors as
completely as if they owned all the shares of stock.
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fact that directors do not have a duty to protect the special interests of
minority shareholders to the same extent they have a duty to take
actions in the best interests of the corporation and all shareholders.235
Moreover, in practice directors may feel that they owe a greater duty
to the particular shareholder who elected them.236
Not having a well-defined duty to minority shareholders,
directors may neglect preserving the balance of power within the
corporation and protecting shareholders' prerogatives in favor of
upholding the "best interest of the corporation." Even if they did
have a well-defined duty to minority shareholders, serving two
masters with different interests would pose uneasy choices for
directors: should they act as monitors of the balance of powers among
the shareholders, or pursue the interests of the corporation?237
Directors are more likely to be supporters of the more identifiable
and familiar interests of the corporation in such a situation. Courts,
on the other hand, are not so inhibited in seeking the adequate
protection of the rights of minority shareholders.338 From this
235. While in the most outrageous circumstances directors may be held to have a duty
to the minority shareholders, the violation of such a duty is not likely to be found in the
delicate context of directorial election and removal.
236. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
237. Corporate directors have been put into a difficult position of serving two and more
masters before. See, e.g., Paramount Communications v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del.
1989) (resolving the conflict between directors' duty to the corporation and its
shareholders). For the difficulty of ascertaining the beneficiary as the main reason for
inadequacy of the trust metaphor in connection with the duties of corporate directors, see
Lewis A. Kornhauser, The Nexus of Contracts Approach to Corporations: A Comment on
Easterbrook and Fischel, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1449, 1449-50 (1989). For establishing
directors' duties to other constituencies, such as employees, customers and creditors, see
N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 717. This issue prompted the famous Berle-Dodd debate
regarding corporate constituency statutes. See A.A. Berle, Jr., Corporate Powers as
Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1049 (1931); E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are
Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145 (1932). However, the fact that
directors have been faced with such choices before is no reason for making directors'
choices even more difficult in the future.
238. The court in Markovitz v. Markovitz, affirming the removal and a two-year bar
from re-election of a director elected by cumulative voting, set forth in its reasoning that
the decision adequately provides for minority representation on the board of directors.
See Markovitz v. Markovitz, 8 A.2d 46,48 (Pa. 1939). For the details of the case, see supra
notes 108-11 and accompanying text. In Gershel v. Town & Country Management Corp.,
however, the court demonstrated a surprising disregard for minority shareholder interest
in having a representative on the board:
Plaintiff also contends that if the shareholders' meeting is not stayed and if he
were removed as a [director], he would not have the opportunity as he does now
to protect his huge investment. The unfortunate and truly regrettable fact is that
Plaintiff never had that control in the first place. He is now one of 6 directors.
Five directors have expressed their desire to control the corporation without him.
Under those circumstances, what meaningful effect would his one vote have?
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standpoint, courts are better situated to determine whether the
removal remedy is appropriate.
(3) Court's Expertise
Efficiency of the procedure for the removal of directors hinges
not only on promptness and low cost, but also on the ability of the
removing authority to reach a correct result. There are situations
where the board is allowed to make decisions similar to those
involved in the removal remedy, such as the removal of officers or
employees for cause, where the finding of misconduct is made without
recourse to judicial proceedings. However, this authority flows from
the board's right to appoint officers, and often extends even to
removal without cause. Discharging an appointee is more justifiable
than discharging an equal.
The removal remedy at issue is at the crossroads of three
concepts that coexist uncomfortably in one litigation: the finding of
fraud or other similar gross misconduct, the determination of whether
removing a director would be in the best interests of the corporation
and the finding of "impairment" to removal by shareholders. The
issues of the existence of misconduct and impairment to removal are
matters of law and fact, for which the court is better equipped than
the board. Moreover, the competence of the court to determine
whether the wrong justifies a particular sanction is a basic judicial
function and one for which the board is unevenly qualified. Courts'
expertise is thus another argument against granting the board the
authority to remove directors for misconduct without recourse to
judicial process.
The discussion in Section B below will argue that the board, on
the other hand, should have the power to halt a removal action upon
a determination that removal would not be in the best interests of the
corporation, as well as the power to file a suit for removal.
B. Protecting the Interests of the Corporation: Board over Court
(1) An Unusual Distinction Between Direct and Derivative Actions
One issue that dramatically affects the ability of the board to
participate in an action concerning a corporation is whether a
shareholder suit is brought as a direct or derivative action. The main
consequence of characterizing the suit as derivative is that various
impediments to bringing the suit are triggered. The requirement that
a shareholder first should make a demand on the board before
No. CIV.A.6843, 1982 WL 17878, at *4 (Del. Ch. July 1, 1982). This case, however,
concerned the removal of directors by shareholders, rather than by the court.
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bringing an action and the right of the board to dismiss derivative
suits are safeguards designed to fortify the role of the board in
pursuing corporate interests.239
The removal remedy does not fit comfortably into the definition
of either a direct or a derivative action. The traditional distinction
between these actions is drawn depending on the identity of the
injured party.240 If the injury is to a shareholder as such, the action is
direct. A direct action is brought by a shareholder in his own name
and for his own benefit. A direct action could also be brought by a
class of injured shareholders as a class action. If the injury is to the
corporation, however, the action is brought by one or more
shareholders in the name and for the benefit of the corporation, and
therefore is derivative.
On the one hand, the right to elect and remove directors belongs
to the shareholders, and an action to enforce voting rights has
traditionally been considered direct.241 Consequently, solely from this
standpoint, a suit to remove a director resembles a direct action.
On the other hand, the "fraudulent or dishonest conduct, or
gross abuse of authority or discretion, with respect to the
corporation 242 standard that gives rise to the removal remedy is by
definition an injury to the corporation rather than to any particular
shareholder or group of shareholders. In addition, a plaintiff
shareholder does not need to (and hardly can) claim that his voting
rights were violated, because he has already voted and the grievance
at issue is the subsequent misbehavior of a person who was duly
elected. Moreover, the owners of non-voting shares, who obviously
could not assert a violation of their voting rights, have the same rights
to sue for removal under the removal statutes as the owners of voting
shares.243
The Model Act attempts to solve the direct versus derivative
dilemma, albeit in a unique and arbitrary way, in the Official
Comment to Section 8.09: removal actions initiated by shareholders
239. Other hurdles to bringing derivative actions include "security for expenses"
statutes and the contemporaneous ownership rule. For a brief description of these
impediments to a derivative action, see supra notes 194-99 and accompanying text.
Another consequence of characterizing a suit as derivative is the payment of the plaintiff's
attorney's fees by the corporation in a successful action.
240. For a description of problems in classifying shareholders' suits as direct or
derivative in general and for examples of the attempts of clever plaintiffs and defendants
to characterize their suits as direct or derivative depending on the possible benefits of such
characterization, see CLARK, supra note 128, at 662-64.
241. See id. at 662.
242. MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. § 8.09(a)(1) (Supp. 1997); supra note 36.
243. See, e.g., MODEL Bus. CORP. ACr ANN. § 8.09 (Supp. 1997). N.Y. Bus. CORP.
LAW § 706(d) (McKinney 1986).
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holding less than 10% of shares are brought derivatively, while
actions initiated by the holders of 10% of shares or more are brought
directly.244 The basis for the former part of the rule apparently is the
fact that the statutes give the corporation itself standing to bring a suit
for removal, and under general rules any shareholder can always
bring an action on behalf of the corporation. The basis for the latter
part of the rule is perplexing.
Does a shareholder holding less than 10% of a corporation's
shares need to show injury to the corporation if the action is indeed
derivative? And does a shareholder holding more than 10% of the
shares need to show injury to himself as a shareholder in order to
support a direct action? Certainly, upon the magical 10% threshold,
the nature of the injury does not mutate and an injury to the
corporation does not become an injury to a particular shareholder.
The Model Act has already answered the question regarding the
nature of the action by providing that the improper conduct
complained of should be with respect to the corporation rather than
its shareholders: the nature of the action is derivative.245 The Model
Act then disguises the action as direct if brought by a shareholder
holding an arbitrary amount of shares.246
244. MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. § 8.09 official cmt. (Supp. 1997). Because most
state statutes providing for the removal remedy contain virtually the same language as
Section 8.09 of the Model Act, the same distinction between direct and derivative removal
actions appears to be followed by the states. Certain states have even restated the Official
Comment to the Model Act when adopting the removal remedy. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE §
30-1-809 official cmt. Court decisions with respect to this issue, however, are inconsistent.
For example, the court in Koshaba v. Koshaba, 132 P.2d 854, 858-59 (Cal. Ct. App. 1942),
implied that the demand requirement pertinent exclusively to derivative actions was
applicable to the removal action brought by the owner of over 10% of shares, but held
that demand on the board of directors would have been futile in the circumstances. The
court in Edward Sidebotham & Son, Inc. v. Chandler, 7 Cal. Rptr. 216,222 (Cal. Ct. App.
1960), determined that an action brought by an owner of more than 10% of shares was
derivative in nature. The court in Starbird v. Lane, 21 Cal. Rptr. 280, 284-85 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1962) referred to a demand on the board requirement where the suit was brought by
an owner of over 10% of shares, thereby implying that the action was nevertheless
derivative. This demand requirement is strange in light of the fact that the corporation
itself did not have the right to bring a removal action under the then-existing statute, and
thus the demand could not possibly have resulted in the commencement of the removal
action by the corporation. The court in Ross v. 311 North Central Avenue Building Corp.,
264 N.E.2d 406 (Ill. App. Ct. 1970), classified the action as a class action (i.e. direct
action), but treated it as a derivative action in awarding attorneys' fees. Under the
rationale of the Official Comment to the Model Act, it logically follows that in the states
where statutes do not grant the corporation the right to bring a removal action, a
shareholder's derivative action for removal is not possible. See Purdy v. Humphry, 82
N.Y.S.2d 92 (Sup. Ct. 1947), affd, 82 N.Y.S.2d 388 (App. Div. 1948).
245. MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. § 8.09 (Supp. 1997).
246. Allowing a claim derivative in nature to be brought as a direct action is not
unprecedented. Such a deviation from the traditional test has surfaced in other contexts
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Neither the laconic language of the Official Comment to the
Model Act nor other relevant sources explain the rationale
underlying the 10% threshold in a removal action. Apparently, the
threshold is based on an assumption that ownership of 10% of a
company's shares represents a sufficient stake to indicate the
legitimacy of the shareholder's action, and the hurdles of the
derivative action become unnecessary. 247 This assumption, plausible
on its face, invites two inquiries. First, if this assumption were true, it
would be puzzling why the same reasoning would not then hold in any
for reasons that do not apply here. For example, certain court decisions and the ALI
Principles set forth a rule that in a closely held corporation, the court in its discretion may
treat an otherwise derivative action as a direct one, subject to the satisfaction of certain
tests. See, e.g., Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d. 505 (Mass. 1975); ALI
PRINCIPLES, supra note 6, § 7.01(d). The purpose of this rule is to overcome impediments
to bringing derivative actions (such as the demand on the board and security for expenses
requirements that oblige plaintiffs in a derivative action to request that the board bring the
suit before the plaintiff is allowed to proceed himself and to post a bond for the payment
of expenses in an unsuccessful suit, respectively). See supra notes 194-99 and
accompanying text for a description of such impediments. This exception to the derivative
action procedure is supported by various policy considerations, including the low
likelihood that the board of a closely-held corporation will be disinterested. See ALI
PRINCIPLES, supra note 6, § 7.01 cmt. e. Such policy considerations are not always
applicable with respect to the removal remedy, however, because the removal remedy is
designed to apply to both closely-held and public corporations. See MODEL Bus. CORP.
AcT ANN. § 8.09 official cmt. (Supp. 1997). Even if the removal remedy were applicable
only to close corporations, it could be subject to general rules for derivative suits in close
corporations, such as those contemplated by the ALI Principles, and there would be no
need for inventing special rules for the removal remedy. See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note
6, § 7.01 cmt. e.
247. Interestingly, 10% is also the percentage of shares required to call a special
shareholder meeting at which the protesting shareholder may present its case to the
others. See MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. § 7.02(a)(2) (Supp. 1997). On the surface, it
may seem that since any number would be arbitrary, "10%" is not a bad candidate for
such a number, and if the number is reasonable for calling a special shareholder meeting
to remove a director, it would be logical to use the same number for bringing a lawsuit.
However, this is not the case.
In calling a shareholder meeting, the importance of the threshold is that a 1%
shareholder cannot call it, but a 10% shareholder can. In removal actions, however, any
shareholder can bring a suit for removal, since any shareholder can bring a derivative
action on behalf of the corporation. See supra note 33. The main effect of the 10%
threshold is that the suit becomes direct instead of derivative, which means that the board
becomes detached from the removal process.
Upon the shareholder's exercise of his right to compel a meeting to present his case
to other shareholders, the issue of removal remains within the system of shareholder
democracy, and the interests of the corporation are not threatened by outside
interference. In the context of the removal remedy, however, the removal issue leaves the
boundaries of the corporation and enters the judicial system, which may harm the interests
of the corporation. The board's participation in this process, aimed at protecting the
interests of the corporation, is essential. See supra Part III.B.3-5. The need for such
participation does not depend on the number of shareholders bringing the suit.
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other shareholder suit. Those who urge more extensive judicial
review of corporate decisions may see in such a threshold a bright
future for the expansion of shareholder lawsuits. Second, while a
share ownership threshold that would allow a shareholder's action to
bypass the procedural hurdles of the derivative action may become a
valid object of study in corporate law in its own right, is this rule a
valuable feature in the removal remedy? Regardless of whether such
a threshold is justifiable for derivative actions in general, there are
two reasons why the removal remedy may be less suited to launch
such procedural bifurcation than other derivative actions. These
reasons will be described in more detail in the remainder of this
Section B.
(2) More Shares Do Not Mean More Legitimacy
There is some logic underlying the idea that the legitimacy of a
derivative action is proportional to the percentage of shares owned by
the plaintiff. It is precisely such a rationale that led to the adoption of
"security for expenses" statutes 48 which required plaintiffs holding
less than a minimum percentage of shares in the corporation to post
security for the payment of the defendant's reasonable expenses in
the event the court found for the defendant. These statutes were
designed to curtail "strike suits" -frivolous derivative claims aimed at
forcing settlements, brought by plaintiffs with minor stakes in the
corporation.249
However, there is no persuasive reason to believe (or empirical
evidence to show) that the removal remedy is any likelier to induce
strike suits than any other corporate law remedy. "Fraudulent or
dishonest conduct," the relevant standard in a removal action, is more
difficult to prove or even assert than the simple violation of duty of
loyalty or duty of care which is usually the focus of the derivative
action, thereby making this task more difficult for ill-intentioned
plaintiffs. Moreover, as described in Section C of Part H above, the
consequences to directors are apt to be less serious in the event of a
removal than in other actions for a violation of the duty of loyalty. It
therefore seems reasonable to speculate that directors would be no
248. See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 627 (McKinney 1986).
249. "Security for expenses" statutes were adopted by a number of states after the
increase in derivative actions brought by dissatisfied shareholders following the Great
Depression. In particular, they were prompted by a report prepared by the New York
Chamber of Commerce in 1944 (the Wood Report) that revealed that only 8% of the
nearly 1300 derivative actions produced corporate recovery and concluded that most
actions were brought by "strike suitors." For a description of the history of "security for
expenses" statutes, see CLARK, supra note 128, at 652-55.
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more (and probably less) willing to settle with a plaintiff in a removal
case than in a typical derivative action.
Interestingly, the arbitrary 10% threshold may have an effect
opposite to that intended. Large shareholders may be more likely
than minor ones to bring frivolous actions for the removal of a
director. Indeed, a removal action could be used by shareholders as
an effective and relatively cheap tool in a corporate power struggle or
even a hostile takeover, to eliminate the directors who resist the
power shift3250 Only persons with substantial shareholdings would be
involved in power struggles and thus interested in using the removal
process for such purposes. While larger shareholders would not be
immune from the requirement to prove fraud, facilitating removal
suits for such shareholders might encourage the use of such suits on
the corporate control battlefield. The mere filing of a suit, however
frivolous, by a company engaging in a takeover would serve to
intimidate uncooperative directors of the target corporation,251 and
intimidation is one of the weapons commonly used in power
struggles. 52
Thus, removal actions brought by a large shareholder may in fact
be less legitimate than those brought by a small shareholder and as
such should not be encouraged with excessive enthusiasm.
250. The Official Comment to the Model Act recognizes this danger by making a
general statement that the removal remedy "is not intended to permit judicial resolution
of internal corporate struggles for control except in those cases in which a court finds that
the director has been guilty of wrongful conduct of the type described." MODEL Bus.
CORP. Acr ANN. § 8.09 official cmt. (Supp. 1997). Takeover attempts frequently trigger
both entrenchment by the target corporation's management and attempts by acquirors to
dislodge target management. For example, in Dataproducts Corp. v. DPC Acquisition
Partners, No. CIV.A.10839, 1989 WL 155469 (Del. Ch. Dec. 26, 1989), potential acquirors
were soliciting written shareholder consents to remove and replace the target
corporation's board of directors, and the target corporation unsuccessfully sought to
prevent such removal. For a discussion of the potential inefficiencies of corporate
takeovers with respect to the corporation's management, see John Pound, The Rise of the
Political Model of Corporate Governance and Corporate Control, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1003,
1020-23 (1993). For a discussion of the conflict of interests between management and
shareholders in the tender offer context, see Ronald J. Gilson, A Structural Approach to
Corporations: The Case Against Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REV. 819,
819-31 (1981).
251. There is evidence that officers and directors feel threatened by takeovers, probably
due to the fear of losing their positions. See, e.g., Jeffrey N. Gordon, Corporations,
Markets and Courts, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1931, 1958-59 (1991).
252. See, e.g., RALPH C. FERRARA ET AL., TAKEOVERS ATTACKS AND SURVIVAL 64
(1987):
[A] "bear hug" strategy... involves a (more or less) "friendly" overture by the
bidder to the target's management and which may be followed by a more
coercive and aggressive approach if management rebuffs the embrace.... [T]he
"bear hug" may serve as an opening move in a hostile game that puts pressure on
the target's management in the hope that management will make a mistake.
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(3) Principal Board Powers in Litigation
One of the hallmarks of U.S. corporate law is that the business
and affairs of the corporation are managed by, or under the direction
of, its board of directors.253 Thus, in corporate governance, the board
is the body specifically entrusted with the pursuit of the best interests
of the corporation. Under this principle, the board of directors
should have an active role in removal actions since the goal of the
removal remedy is to protect the interests of the corporation.
However, the primary effect of making removal actions direct, rather
than derivative, is to limit the board's role in the litigation.
As the affairs of the corporation are managed by the board of
directors, it is the board (or in certain instances committees or officers
empowered by the board) that takes the following actions:
(i) deciding whether to file a claim for damages or other relief against
a third party, a fellow director or an officer of the corporation; 4 (ii)
considering the demand (served on the board by a shareholder) to file
suit and then either taking charge of the litigation or rejecting the
demand, thereby barring the advancement of the action; and
(iii) requiring the dismissal of the derivative suit. However, as
explained in more detail below, extant statutes and court decisions
largely deny the board these prerogatives in the context of a removal
action.
The first of the above powers is self-explanatory. Surprisingly,
with respect to a removal action, laws of some states even fail to name
the corporation as a possible plaintiff.255 Accordingly, court decisions
in such states hold that the corporation itself does not have power to
253. See MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. § 8.01(b) (Supp. 1997); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW
§ 701 (McKinney 1986); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (1974).
254. Structural bias theory, however, holds that a system that calls upon the board to
pass judgment on its own members is fundamentally suspect. Proponents of this view
suggest that directors are subject to social and psychological pressures that make them
reluctant to sanction their fellow board members. For example, while an outside director
may openly oppose another board member on a transaction he feels is unfair, he may feel
less free to tell that director that he believes a suit against him has sufficient merit to
proceed. See Coffee & Schwartz, supra note 172, at 283. For a discussion of structural
bias in the board, see Coffee & Schwartz, supra; Kenneth E. Scott, Corporation Law and
the American Law Institute Corporate Governance Project, 35 STAN. L. REV. 927, 944-45
(1983); James D. Cox & Harry L. Munsinger, Bias in the Boardroom Psychological
Foundations and Legal Implications of Corporate Cohesion, 48 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
Summer 1985, at 83; Note, The Propriety of Judicial Deference to Corporate Boards of
Directors, 96 HARv. L. REv. 1894 (1983). The structural bias theory, however, has not
been followed by courts or legislatures and is not accepted by most academics.
255. See e.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 706(d) (McKinney 1986). Some states do not
even require a corporation to be joined as a party to the removal action. See, e.g., CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-743 (West 1997).
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protect its own interests by filing a removal suit.256 For example, in a
recent New York case, Management Technologies, Inc. v. Morris,257
the corporation (represented by its chief executive officer) filed a suit
seeking, among other relief, the removal of two directors. The
plaintiff claimed that the directors had been engaged in a scheme to
purchase for themselves certain assets of the company's British
subsidiaries at bargain prices, had caused these subsidiaries to default
on obligations to British Inland Revenue in order precipitate a
liquidation of those entities and purchase their assets, and had even
sought to gain access to the company's London offices with an axe in
order to remove papers revealing their alleged wrongdoing and
threatened the security guards!258 The court was sympathetic to the
plaintiff and granted a preliminary injunction partially limiting the
directors' authority, but announced that it was unable to remove the
directors due to the lack of a statutory provision allowing the
corporation itself to bring a removal action.259 It is difficult to discern
any legitimate reasons for such discrimination against a corporation in
favor of minority shareholders where the corporation's interests are
at stake.
The second power of the board represents a well-settled rule of
corporate law that before bringing a derivative suit, a shareholder
must first file a demand on the board of directors requesting the
board to take action to remedy the situation that is the subject of the
shareholder's complaint. 26 The demand requirement, however, is not
applicable when demand would be "futile." Demand is usually
considered futile if the majority of the board has a personal financial
interest in the subject transaction, since such interest may impair the
board's objectivity on the matter.261 A rejection of the shareholder's
demand by the independent directors prevents the shareholder from
asserting the corporation's cause of action, unless the shareholder
demonstrates that the refusal of the demand was "wrongful." Refusal
may be proven wrongful by showing that the directors adopting the
decision were not truly independent, that the procedures used in
adopting the decision were flawed, or that the decision was otherwise
not a product of valid business judgment.262 Therefore, unless a
256. See, e.g., Management Techs., Inc. v. Morris, 961 F. Supp. 640,650 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)
(for a description, see infra notes 257-59 and accompanying text); Purdy v. Humphry, 82
N.Y.S.2d 92 (Sup. Ct. 1947), affd, 82 N.Y.S.2d 388 (App. Div. 1948).
257. 961 F. Supp. 640.
258. See idL at 643, 650 & n.16.
259. See id at 650-52.
260. See, e.g., MODEL Bus. CORP. ACr ANN. § 7.42 (Supp. 1997).
261. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805,811-12 (Del. 1984).
262. See, e.g., Issner v. Aldrich, 254 F. Supp. 696, 699 (D. Del. 1966); Pogostin v. Rice,
480 A.2d 619,624-25 (Del. 1984).
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shareholder can demonstrate that demand should be excused or that
the refusal of the demand was wrongful, the shareholder cannot
proceed with the lawsuit. This is a universally accepted rule in all
jurisdictions.263 The Model Act and the ALI Principles adhere to the
demand procedures and even expand them by adopting a "universal
demand" requirement.264 Under the Model Act and similar state
provisions, however, in proceedings for the removal of a director for
misbehavior toward the corporation, a suit for the removal of
directors filed by a holder of at least 10% of the corporation's shares
is filed as a direct action 2 65 Thus, the demand requirement applicable
to derivative actions becomes inapplicable to such removal
proceedings.
The third power traditionally reserved for the board relates to
the dismissal of derivative suits. If a shareholder's derivative suit is
able to bypass the board, the corporation can nevertheless file a
motion to dismiss the action based on a finding of the independent
directors, or a committee formed by them, that proceeding with the
suit will not be in the best interests of the corporation.266 Only a
minimum standard of review generally applies, whereunder the court
will defer to the decision of the committee unless there was a showing
that it was not truly independent, did not act in good faith, or did not
pursue its tasks diligently.2 67 Since a removal action brought by a
10% shareholder is direct, in such an action the board is deprived of
its power and duty to dismiss a lawsuit contrary to the interests of the
corporation.
Thus, the role of the board embodied in most removal statutes
and court decisions in removal proceedings initiated by the holders of
at least 10% of a corporation's shares appears to be limited as follows:
The corporation (and, accordingly, the board) has the right to
intervene in litigation and express its opinions on the matter, but does
not have the opportunity to consider the demand or the power to
dismiss the suit. The court will then be willing to hear the board's
263. See, e.g., Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984). For an overview of cases on
demand in various jurisdictions, see MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. 7-278 to 7-288 (Supp.
1997).
264. In accordance with this requirement, demand is not necessary only if "irreparable
injury" to the corporation would result if the proceedings are delayed in order to comply
with the demand procedures. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. § 7.42(2) (Supp. 1997);
ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 6, § 7.03(b).
265. See MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. § 8.09 official cmt.
266. See, e.g., MODEL BuS. CORP. Acr ANN. § 7.44 (Supp. 1997).
267. See Auerbach v. Bennett, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1002-03 (N.Y. 1979). Moderate judicial
scrutiny was established in the Delaware Supreme Court case Zapata Corporation v.
Maldonado for demand-excused situations. 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981). Even the Zapata
test, however, contemplates deference to the decision of the independent directors with
respect to the determination of the best interests of the corporation. See supra note 177.
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arguments, but does not need to defer to its decisions, and will
determine the merit of the case itself.268
Such a statutory stance is a striking deviation from the usual rules
requiring demand on the board and granting the board the power to
dismiss derivative actions. It is noteworthy that the Model Act itself
promotes the demand requirement and requires the court to dismiss a
derivative proceeding upon a finding by independent directors that
litigation is not in the best interests of the corporation.2 69 The
standard of judicial scrutiny of the determination of independent
directors under the Model Act is rather low. Moreover, in general
the Model Act has usually been viewed as a staunch supporter of
board authority. As such, it has even been characterized as the
"Authority Model" (as opposed to the "Responsibility Model,"
embodied in the ALl Principles and aimed at diminishing the
authority of the board by increasing its accountability).270 And, in
most respects, the Model Act deserves this label.
Section 8.09 of the Model Act, the judicial removal of directors
provision, however, is out of character. Honoring the authority of the
board on all other accounts, the Model Act goes further than the ALI
Principles,271 and incomparably further than Delaware, in its denial of
the board's right to be the main player in litigation where the best
268. While the removal statutes imply that the determination of the corporation's best
interests should be made by the court, they do not state such a requirement and therefore
do not specifically prohibit the court's deference to board decisions regarding such
interests. It is now the turn of the courts to develop a doctrine of deference to board
determinations regarding the best interests of the corporation, as they did in the past when
developing a business judgment rule, demand requirement, and deference to the findings
of special litigation committees.
269. MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. § 7.42, § 7.44 and official cmt. (Supp. 1997).
270. See generally Michael Dooley, Two Models of Corporate Governance, 47 Bus.
LAW. 461 (1992).
271. The ALI Principles propose higher judicial oversight to scrutinize the board's
refusal to proceed with litigation where a derivative action is brought against a director for
violation of the duty of loyalty. However, the ALI Principles do not eliminate the demand
requirement when suits for the violation of the duty of loyalty are brought by a certain
minimum number of shareholders. Even with a higher standard of judicial review, they
still preserve the court's deference to the board's decision to reject demand and dismiss a
derivative action. With respect to the demand refusal, deference is sustained unless the
complaint pleads with particularity facts that, if true, raise a significant prospect that either
the disinterested directors who rejected the demand did not satisfy the requirements of the
business judgment rule or the disinterested directors could not reasonably have
determined that rejection of the demand was in the best interests of the corporation. See
ALl PRINCIPLEs, supra note 6, 88 7.04(a)(2)(C), 4.01(c)(2). With respect to the
determination to dismiss a suit, the test is whether the board or committee was adequately
informed and reasonably determined that dismissal was in the best interests of the
corporation, "based on grounds that the court deems to warrant reliance." Id §
7.10(a)(2). For an adoption of the approach set forth in the ALI Principles, see Cuker v.
Mikalauskas, 692 A.2d 1042, 1048-49 (Pa. 1997).
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interests of the corporation are at issue. The appearance of Section
8.09 in the Model Act in its present form is unexplained and
unexplainable. 272
Something inherently peculiar and dangerous about removal
proceedings would need to be demonstrated to justify such a
deviation from the rule of conventional derivative actions. Ironically,
however, the nature of removal proceedings justifies more judicial
deference to the board's decisions, not less.
(4) Common Grounds for the Board's Role in Conventional Derivative and
in Removal Proceedings
Numerous justifications have been advanced for the demand
requirement in derivative litigation.273 Perhaps the most important is
that the demand requirement helps implement the basic principle that
the business and affairs of the corporation are managed by the board
of directors and not the shareholders. The board's prerogative
includes the determination of whether a lawsuit would be in the best
interests of the corporation. The demand requirement provides
directors with an opportunity to reject a demand or require early
dismissal of the case if they determine the suit not to be in the best
interests of the corporation.274
The principal justification for the board's right to dismiss a
derivative suit is very similar to this first reason for the demand
requirement. The decision whether to pursue a lawsuit against a third
party is a business judgment like any other. One of the foundations
of the business judgment rule, in turn, is that courts do not consider
themselves competent to decide business matters.275 The drafters of
272. See supra note 16.
273. The analysis in this Section employs the classification of reasons for the demand
requirement set forth in CLARK, supra note 128, at 641. For alternative classifications of
justifications for demand, see ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 6, § 7.03 cmt. c; Thomas P.
Kinney, Comment, Stockholder Derivative Suits: Demand and Futility Where the Board
Fails to Stop Wrongdoers, 78 MARQ. L. REV. 172, 176 (1994).
274. However, the ALI Principles note that not all states concur with Delaware's view
that the demand rule effectuates a "substantive allocation of power to the board to dismiss
a derivative litigation." ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 6, § 7.03 cmt. c.
275. See, e.g., Auerbach v. Bennett, 393 N.E.2d 994 (N.Y. 1979). Also, as Chancellor
Allen said, the business judgment rule "reflects the fact that ours is an economic order in
which investment choices and implementing business decisions are chiefly made by private
persons, not by government functionaires or judges.... [I]n our social order courts are...
not thought to be very good institutionally at making such judgments." William T. Allen,
Investment Bankers' and Judicial Review of Corporate Action to Defeat Hostile Takeovers:
Comments on Chapter 6, in THE BATTLE FOR CORPORATE CONTROL: SHAREHOLDER
RIGHTS, STAKEHOLDER INTERESTS, & MANAGERIAL RESPONSIBILITIES 131, 134-35
(Arnold W. Sametz & James L. Bicksler eds., 1991), quoted in Dennis J. Block et al.,
Chancellor Allen's Jurisprudence: Chancellor Allen, the Business Judgment Rule, and the
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the Model Act themselves maintain that the requirement of dismissal
of the derivative action upon the determination by the independent
directors that pursuing the lawsuit is not in the best interests of the
corporation "confirms the basic principle that a derivative suit is an
action on behalf of the corporation and therefore should be
controlled by those directors who can exercise an independent
business judgment with respect to its continuance. '" 276
One may argue that the origin of the removal right is what
distinguishes removal proceedings from conventional derivative
proceedings. In a typical derivative action, the claim belongs to the
corporation, and the corporation, acting through its board of
directors, files a lawsuit if the board finds it meritorious. In contrast,
the right to remove directors inherently belongs to the shareholders
and thus, one may assert, it might be more appropriate for a
shareholder to bring action with respect to a right in his own domain.
This argument, however, is not sustainable for the following reason.
The right to elect directors belongs to all shareholders
collectively and can only be exercised through appropriate voting
procedures. A 10% shareholder is not a better representative of all
the shareholders than is the board.2 77 On the contrary, it may be
argued that the holders of the remaining 90% of the shares did not
elect the 10% shareholder purporting to act as their representative,
but did collectively elect the board, which is therefore in a better
position to represent the shareholders' collective preferences. If the
right to remove directors were indeed regarded as the unconditionally
inalienable right of the shareholders, then neither a 10% shareholder,
Shareholders' Right to Decide, 17 DEL. J. CORP. L. 785, 790 (1992). For a criticism of this
justification of the business judgment rule, and for a description of other justifications, see
Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Divergence of Standards of Conduct and Standards of Review
in Corporate Law, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 437 (1993). See also Coffee & Schwartz, supra
note 172, at 280-84. For an overview of court decisions on the business judgment rule, see
Cuker v. Mikalauskas, 692 A.2d 1042,1045-47 (Pa. 1997).
276. MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. ch. 7, subch. D, introductory cmt. (Supp. 1997).
The Official Comment to the Model Act continues as follows: "At the same time, the
court is required to assess the independence and good faith of the directors and the
reasonableness of their inquiry and, if a majority of the board is not independent, the
burden is placed on the corporation to prove each of these elements." ld. For a skeptical
approach to courts' deference to the findings of litigation committees, see James D. Cox,
Searching for the Corporation's Voice in Derivative Suit Litigation: A Critique of Zapata
and the ALl Project, 1982 DUKE LJ. 959.
277. The situation where the shareholder seeks to remove the director that it alone
elected through cumulative voting may be an exception. However, as demonstrated by
the existing cases, the likelihood of such a situation arising in practice is very low.
Moreover, the same situation may arise with respect to a holder of less than 10% of
shares. If an exception needs to be carved out for this particular case, it needs to be tied to
the fact that the shareholder has elected the directors by cumulative voting and not to the
number of shares owned by the shareholder.
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nor the board, nor the court could claim to represent shareholders in
a removal action. However, the law makes an exception to this right
in order to allow removal without asking the shareholders' opinion if
the misbehavior was truly egregious and if the removal is in the best
interests of the corporation. This latter requirement closes the circle
and brings us back to the original purpose of the demand and
dismissal rules. This purpose is fully applicable in the removal
situation: the business and affairs of a corporation are managed by its
board of directors, it is the board that determines the best interests of
the corporation, and it is the board that should determine such
interests in a removal action, as it does in a derivative action.278
The second common argument in favor of the demand
requirement is that it may promote judicial economy, because some
demands may lead to corrective action short of suit, and therefore
judicial consideration of the dispute may not be necessary. This is no
more or less true in the case of removal proceedings than in other
derivative proceedings. A common example of the application of the
judicial economy principle is that the board may choose to dismiss an
employee instead of suing him for damages.2 79 In a removal
proceeding, the board might decide to take a different but equally
appropriate action, for example, to proceed with a suit for damages or
disgorgement of profits but not the removal of the director o or
perhaps simply to reprimand the director.
Finally, the demand requirement protects directors from the
harassment of litigious shareholders and generally discourages "strike
suits."281  It likewise discourages unmeritorious "power struggle"
suits, which could be brought by large shareholders seeking to gain
greater control over the corporationm Overall, there is no
fundamental difference between a suit for a director's removal and a
derivative action against a director that would warrant granting the
board demand and dismissal rights in the derivative but not the
removal setting.
278. Commentators have affirmed the unique ability of the directors to determine
business matters even when the board is interested: "Although some faint aura of
legitimacy accrues to the plaintiffs attorney to represent the corporate interest when the
demand requirement has been excused, that aura is no substitute for the unique capability
of the board of directors to analyze the costs and benefits of the suit from the corporate
perspective." Cox, supra note 276, at 960-61 (footnote omitted).
279. See, e.g., Cramer v. Gen. Tel. & Elec. Corp., 582 F.2d 259,275 (3d Cir. 1978).
280. This was precisely the outcome reached by the court in the Remillard Brick case.
Remillard Brick Co. v. Remillard-Dandini Co., 241 P.2d 66,77 (Cal. Ct. App. 1952). For a
brief description of the Remillard Brick decision, see supra notes 138-42 and
accompanying text.
281. See CLARK, supra note 128, at 641. For a description of the concept of strike suits,
see supra note 249 and accompanying text.
282. See supra Part II.B.2.
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(5) Greater Need for the Board's Involvement in Removal Proceedings
In removal proceedings, the board's role is even more justified
than in a typical derivative action. One of the reasons courts advance
as a basis for the business judgment rule is the fact that the board is
better positioned than the judiciary to decide business issues.283 In
contrast, however, where the propriety of deference to the board's
decision to reject a demand or dismiss a derivative action is at issue,
some courts and commentators have argued that judges do have the
expertise to analyze the merits of a lawsuit because the
appropriateness of litigation is as much a legal question as a business
one. This recognition does not mean that courts will no longer
afford special litigation committees of the board the benefit of the
business judgment rule. For instance, in Auerbach v. Bennett the
court held that while the judicial system is well equipped to make
determinations with respect to lawsuits, the ultimate decision not to
pursue litigation
falls squarely within the embrace of the business judgment
doctrine, involving as it did the weighing and balancing of legal,
ethical, commercial, promotional, public relations, fiscal and other
factors familiar to the resolution of many if not most corporate
problems. To this extent, the conclusion reached by the special
litigation committee is outside the scope of our review.2m5
The ALI Principles, on the other hand, used the court's aptitude to
evaluate the merits of a lawsuit as one of the justifications for
increased judicial scrutiny of board decisions to dismiss derivative
suits. 28
6
To determine whether the removal of a particular director is in
the interests of the corporation, in addition to the above
considerations pertinent to typical derivative actions, the professional
qualifications of the director, the importance of the director for the
business of the company, the availability of persons with similar
qualifications, and other relevant business factors should be taken
283. See, e.g., Auerbach v. Bennett, 393 N.E.2d 994 (N.Y. 1979). For a description of
the business judgment rule, see supra note 275 and accompanying text.
284. See, e.g., Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 688 (Mich. 1919); Auerbach v.
Bennett, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1002 (N.Y. 1979); ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 6, § 7.10 cmt. d
(citing Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 892 (2d Cir. 1982)). An interesting observation was
made by Professor Dooley and Justice Veasey with respect to this argument: "To claim
that courts are more competent to decide questions of law has a surface appeal, but is
ultimately tautological because it amounts to saying that a court is better able to predict
how it is likely to rule on a given matter if asked." Dooley & Veasey, supra note 172, at
536. This observation, however, may be viewed to make the argument even stronger: if
the court knows better than anybody else how it would rule with respect to the derivative
action, why should the board be encouraged to second-guess the court?
285. Auerbach v. Bennett, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1002 (N.Y. 1979).
286. ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 6, § 7.10 cmt. d.
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into account. While the courts may have a special aptitude to
consider the merits of lawsuits for disgorgement of profits or
damages, as may be the case in a typical derivative lawsuit, they do
not have the same aptitude to assess the qualifications of a director.m
Therefore, the removal proceeding makes a better case for judicial
deference to the expertise of the board that decided to retain a
director than a typical derivative action.
The second reason supporting deference to the board of directors
in a removal action lies in the philosophy of corporate governance.
Because only the shareholders have the inherent power to elect and
remove directors, the fact that they have elected directors and not
subsequently exercised their power to remove them should be
honored. Judicial removal is an extraordinary power of the court that
intrudes on shareholders' rights. Lawmakers have made a correct
half-step by providing that directors may not be judicially removed
unless their removal would be in the best interests of the corporation.
The missing half-step is to allow the board to make a determination
of the best interests of the corporation. Such a mechanism would
create a check on the usurpation of shareholders' prerogative by the
court.
The law often imposes safeguards where a judicial decision may
dramatically impact someone's rights, for instance, by establishing a
higher standard of proof, 88 trial by jury,289 or a more extensive appeal
process. 290 The criminal law, for example, prefers underpunishment
to the castigation of the innocent.291 While the violation of rights is
certainly less dramatic in the removal context than in the criminal
context, removal nevertheless constitutes an extreme interference
with shareholder prerogatives. Accordingly, the law should prefer
honoring the choice of shareholders too much rather than too little.
Thus, the unfounded statutory rule that a shareholder holding an
arbitrary amount of shares may bring a removal action as a direct suit
should be eliminated. The general veto rights of the board pertinent
to derivative litigation should be present in a removal action
irrespective of the amount of shares owned by the plaintiff
287. It is a well established principle that courts are not well suited to evaluate
managerial performance and acknowledge such lack of expertise. See Elizabeth Bartholet,
Application of Title VII to Jobs in High Places, 95 HARv. L. REV. 945, 979-80 (1982).
288. See WAYNE R. LAFAvE & AusTiN W. ScoTr, JR., CRIMINAL LAW 16-17 (1986).
289. See CHARLES E. TORCIA, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 574-616 (1991).
290. See id. at 809-78; LAFAvE & SCor, supra note 288, at 16-17.
291. See LAFAVE & ScoTr, supra note 288, at 16. See also In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358
(1970) (holding that the Constitution requires the government to prove a defendant's fault
beyond a reasonable doubt before criminal penalties may attach). This approach is
reflected in the doctrine of presumption of innocence, one of the hallmarks of criminal
procedure.
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shareholder. These veto fights take the form of preventing the
advancement of a lawsuit by rejecting the demand on the board and
dismissing the lawsuit by determining that it is not in the best interests
of the corporation. Certainly, in situations where the board is
interested, the court should use the concepts of "futile" demand and
"wrongful rejection" of demand and not adhere to the board's
determination. For example, in Koshaba v. Koshaba,29 the court
correctly stated that, like in any derivative action, the 25%
shareholder seeking to remove a director would generally need to
serve a demand on the board. However, in that particular case the
board was dominated by the defendant director. The court therefore
resolved that since the demand would have been futile, the plaintiff
did not need to await a formal refusal by the board to proceed with
the removal action.293
The actual decision to remove directors for misconduct, however,
should always be taken by the court rather than the board. This
approach would strike an appropriate balance between the respective
expertise of the court and that of the board, allowing each to
contribute its special skills in determining the outcome of the removal
action.
IV. Suggested Test
A. Inadequacy of Tests Contained in Court Decisions
At present, there are no coherent or workable tests for courts to
use in removal cases. Rather than seek to articulate such a test,
courts are often preoccupied with whether they have the power to
remove a director, and ignore the key issues of whether removal
would be in the best interests of the corporation and why the
shareholders did not themselves remove the director.294  This
292. Koshaba v. Koshaba, 132 P.2d 854 (Cal. Ct. App. 1942). See infra note 294 for
more details on this case.
293. Koshaba, 132 P.2d at 858-59.
294. In Koshaba v. Koshaba, one may hypothesize as to why the shareholders did not
remove the misbehaving director themselves. Perhaps the unpublished trial court decision
contains the key to this puzzle, which the appellate court left unanswered. It is
conceivable and even likely that the director was the controlling shareholder of the
corporation, but the court failed even to mention this fact (possibly because it was not
mentioned in the plaintiffs brief). While the court found that the misbehaving director
dominated the existing board, it did not identify the roots of such domination and seemed
to surmise that if the defendant were removed as a director, his dominance over the board
would cease. The court removed the director and barred him from being reelected as a
director for a period of ten years. It appointed a receiver for the corporation for the
purposes of running it until a new director was elected and of calling a shareholders'
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approach may be an atavism from the times when a distinction was
not yet drawn between directors of business corporations and those of
not-for-profit or municipal corporations or trustees.295 Historically,
not-for-profit, municipal corporations and trusts involved a simple
non-business operation and as such perhaps justified an assumption
that removing a dishonest director would automatically be in the best
interests of the corporation. The structure of such corporations may
also explain obliviousness to the shareholder prerogative, since no
similar constituency with residual interests was generally extant in
these contexts.
Nahikian v. Mattingly is perhaps the only case where the court
attempted to set forth a standard for the application of the removal
remedy.2 96 Yet the test suggested by the Nahikian court exemplifies
the pitfalls of inadequate consideration of the key interests pertinent
to the removal remedy. The court suggested that the defendant
director should be removed if the fraud was "of such nature that...
shareholders should have removed him and have failed to do so upon
request, or that demand of such action by... stockholders would
have been futile."'297 This test has surface appeal: if a director does
something truly awful, and those with power to remove him either do
not take action or it is useless even asking them, then the court should
remove the director itself.
While this test might aspire to establish a universal standard with
respect to the propriety of removal, it is in fact unworkable. The
proper test must strike a balance between a compelling reason for
removal (such as the protection of the interests of the corporation)
and the shareholders' prerogative to remove. As to the former
consideration, Nahikian's grounds for removing the director are
flawed. Presumably, the first prong of the Nahikian test, which states
that a director should be removed if the fraud was "of such nature
meeting to elect a new director. See Koshaba v. Koshaba, 132 P.2d 854 (Cal. Ct. App.
1942); Ross v. 311 N. Cent. Ave. Bldg. Corp., 264 N.E.2d 406 (11. App. Ct. 1970).
295. See Travers, supra note 17, at 393-94 (discussing the lack of distinction by early
writers between corporations serving very different functions; referring also to Williston,
The History of the Law of Business Corporations Before 1800, in 3 SELECr ESSAYS IN
ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 195 (Association of American Law Schools ed.,
1909)). See also John C. Coffee, Jr., Lecture, No Exit?: Opting Out, the Contractual
Theory of the Corporation, and the Special Case of Remedies, 53 BROOK. L. REV. 919, 950
(1988) (observing that corporation principles come from the law of trusts and
distinguishing between the preservation of capital as the goal of a trust and risk-bearing
activity as a purpose of a corporation). For the application of the removal remedy to not-
for-profit corporations, see supra note 48.
296. Nahikian v. Mattingly, 251 N.W. 421 (Mich. 1933). The court, however, did not
apply this test, since it decided the case on other grounds before the test could have come
into play.
297. Id. at 424.
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that directors or shareholders should have removed him" implies a
concern for protecting the interests of the corporation. However, the
decision whether to remove the director should depend not only on
the "nature" of the fraud, but also on other considerations such as the
director's management ability and other factors pertinent to the
interests of the corporation, which the court fails to take into account.
The second prong of the Nahikian test denies the shareholder
prerogative to remove directors by urging removal where
shareholders "have failed to [remove] upon request, or that demand
of [such] action by... stockholders would have been futile. '298 This
prong resembles the classic standard in a derivative action requiring
demand on the board to proceed with the action on behalf of the
corporation, except where demand would be futile. However, it is
different from this derivative action standard in that it fails to ask
whether the board's decision to reject demand should be reversed by
a court because such rejection was wrongful, because, for example,
the directors were interested and therefore incompetent to make the
decision.299 Thus, the second prong does not ask why those with the
removal power did not remove the director: is it because they
represent an interested block that cannot be circumvented, in which
case removal would be justified, or are they a group of unaffiliated
shareholders who denied removal for some other reason, whether
wise or idiosyncratic, in which case the court should bow to their
wishes? Under the Nahikian test, the fact that shareholders said
"No" to removal triggers a "Yes" by the court, instead of prompting
an inquiry into the circumstances of the corporate decision-making
process that could justify respecting the shareholders' will.
At the other extreme, a court's rubber-stamp of the
shareholders' "No" would be equally unacceptable. The Remillard
Brick court's ratification of interested shareholders' self-reelection is
an example of this phenomenon.30°
B. A Proposed Test
A proper test for the removal remedy's application should find a
way to protect both the interests of the corporation and the
prerogatives of its shareholders. 301 The test should establish an
efficient mechanism for determining the best interests of the
corporation and for preventing the removal of directors when their
removal would not be in the best interests of the corporation. The
298. 1&
299. See supra notes 261-62 and accompanying text.
300. See supra notes 138-42 and accompanying text.
301. As discussed in Part II, the interests of the market are not sufficiently compelling
to trump either of these premises.
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test should also fix the boundaries of corporate democracy by
deciding when the inherent rights of shareholders should be honored
and when they should be disregarded.
Identifying the interests of the corporation implies recognizing
that the board is the body that not only is entrusted with determining
and ensuring, but is also best suited to determine and ensure, the
corporation's best interests. Thus, the right to halt lawsuits not in the
corporation's best interests that the board enjoys in a derivative
action should also be available in a removal action. The court should
uphold the board's rejection of a shareholder's demand or the board's
decision to dismiss the removal action on the basis that the removal
action would not be in the best interests of the corporation.
Certainly, the votes of the directors to be removed should not count,
and in general such a board determination could be deemed
unnecessary or overruled on similar grounds as in derivative actions,
for example when a majority of the directors adopting the decision
were interested. Such a resurrection of the board's role would
require the elimination of the unfounded statutory rule that a 10%
shareholder may bring a removal action as a direct suit. To
accomplish such an objective, all removal actions brought by
shareholders should be designated as derivative.
After affording the board an appropriate opportunity to halt the
proposed suit, courts must weigh the competing interests at stake in
removal actions. This could be accomplished through a three-prong
test.
The first and obvious prong, which is already explicit in statutes
and court decisions, is the finding of gross misbehavior of a director:
that "the director engaged in fraudulent and dishonest conduct, or
gross abuse of authority or discretion, with respect to the
corporation. ' 30 2 This prong aligns with both premises of the removal
remedy. In conditioning the removal remedy upon directorial
misconduct, it upholds, on its face, the best interests of the
corporation. This prong is also minimally intrusive upon shareholder
prerogative because it limits the court's interference to certain
presumably rare circumstances. However, this prong only defines a
minimum threshold for judicial intervention, necessary as a matter of
statutory drafting but insufficient to guide courts in exercising their
discretion. Thus, the next two prongs are necessary.
The second prong seeks to promote the interests of the
corporation. Since the determination of the interests of the
corporation should be made in light of the director's qualifications
and other complex business considerations, the court should endorse
302. MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. § 8.09 (Supp. 1997).
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the board's finding that removal of the subject director is in the
corporation's best interests. Only if the court could not adhere to the
board's determination (if, for example, the determination was made
by interested directors or was not made at all) should the court reach
its own conclusion regarding the best interests of the corporation. In
no event should the court merely assume that removal would be
beneficial to the corporation, and only a positive determination of this
issue should lead to removal.
The third prong focuses on shareholders' prerogative to elect and
remove directors. It requires a showing by the plaintiff of what was
termed above as an "impairment" to the exercise of shareholder
voting. "Impairment" could be found either in a broadly defined
conflict of interest on the part of a shareholder who controls votes
necessary to remove a director ("divergence of interests
impairment") or in the shareholders' inability to effect the removal
due to a defective operation of the voting process ("procedural
impairment"). If no impairment is found, the court's interference in
corporate governance by effecting the removal remedy is
unwarranted.
In applying the third prong, courts should be cognizant of the
fact that impairment to removal could be cured or disproved by
shareholder action. In cases of supposed procedural impairment,
where shareholders through proper voting procedures have reelected
or affirmatively voted to retain a director whom they know to have
committed a misdeed, such action shows the absence or cessation of
procedural impairment. Upon such an occurrence, the court's
interference becomes unfounded.3 3 For a divergence of interests
impairment to be disproved, a majority of the shareholders
unaffected by the impairment would need to decide affirmatively, in
accord with the interested shareholders, to retain or reelect the
misbehaving director. The mere reelection of directors by the
interested shareholders, however, should not prevent judicial
removal.
Because circumstances where the decisions of controlling
shareholders are impaired by their divergence of interests present the
opportunity for recurring abuse, the court could entertain imposing a
bar on reelecting guilty directors. However, bars on the reelection of
303. Indeed, this conclusion is consistent with the rule proposed in the ALI Principles
which requires the dismissal of a derivative suit upon a concerted shareholders' action.
See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 6, § 7.11. A removal action, however, makes a much
better case for adherence to shareholders' action than a typical derivative action because
removal of directors is a prerogative of the shareholders acting as a group, unlike an action
in the name of the corporation which is within the domain of the board.
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directors are not warranted in procedural impairment situations
because procedural impairment is nearly always transitory.
This suggested test still leaves the discretion to the court to
decide whether or not to remove a director. For example, even if the
court determines that gross misbehavior has taken place, that
impairment to removal by shareholders exists, and that removal is in
the best interests of the corporation (perhaps adhering to the board's
determination on the last point), it may decline to remove the guilty
directors if there is a compelling reason to keep them on the board.
While the existence of such a reason may be unlikely, it is
nevertheless conceivable. For example, the court's determination
that removal would unduly affect the balance of powers in the
corporation might form a basis for such a decision. However, the
proposed test would confine the court's discretion to the
circumstances where removal would not unduly harm the interests of
the corporation or deprive the shareholders of their inherent rights.
On the other hand, the test would liberate the court's discretion in
situations where, according to existing precedents, improper
shareholder actions (such as self-reelection of guilty directors) were
considered to deprive the court of its powers. The proposed test,
which could be introduced judicially or codified by statute, would
place judicial reasoning on a more solid foundation and be more
consistent and likely to reach correct results.
Conclusion
No theory that would reconcile the conflicting approaches of
various authorities to the removal remedy has been developed by
legislators, judges or academics. This article proposes such a theory
and a test for applying the remedy.
The theoretical approach to the judicial removal remedy should
be based on two conflicting interests, the relation between which
determines the propriety of the remedy. The first interest, that of
shareholder democracy, if taken alone, perceives the judicial removal
remedy as totally unwarranted because voting to elect or remove a
director is the prerogative of the shareholders. In contrast, the
second interest, that of the corporation, requires the court to intrude
upon such shareholder rights if necessary to protect the corporation
from continuing directorial wrongdoing °4 These two interests,
304. A third possible interest would view certain public policy objectives, most
importantly the deterrence of directorial misbehavior in the marketplace, to be important
enough to justify ignoring both the best interests of the corporation and the wishes of its
shareholders. This third interest, however, is a poor basis for the removal remedy, both
because the removal remedy has no noticeable market-wide deterrent effect and because
alternative remedies exist that could have a similar or greater deterrent effect but would
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however, can be reconciled to support a judicial removal remedy. In
particular, the court should intervene to uphold the interests of the
corporation where the shareholders' exercise of their voting rights is
"impaired" either because removal is unduly blocked by an interested
shareholder who controls the voting ("divergence of interests
impairment" to the vote) or because the voting mechanism is
unavailable or otherwise procedurally impeded ("procedural
impairment" to the vote).
The allocation of responsibilities in applying the removal remedy
should be based on the theory set forth above. When the
shareholders fail to remove directors because of the existence of a
procedural or divergence of interests impairment, the court and the
board should both participate in ascertaining the propriety of removal
in accordance with their respective areas of competence.
Determining whether removing a director is in the best interests of
the corporation, in light of a director's qualifications and other
business considerations, constitutes a business judgment that is in the
proper purview of the board. The court, however, remains better
suited to determine the legitimacy of disregarding the shareholders'
prerogative to remove directors by finding an "impairment" to
shareholder voting and to gauge the gravity of the wrong committed
by the director. The court would also be a better guard of the balance
of powers within the corporation that may be affected by removal
than the board.
The test proposed in this article upholds both shareholder rights
and the interests of the corporation. At the outset, the test takes into
consideration the relative competence of the court and the board
described above by recommending that a safeguard available in
derivative actions, the authority of the board to halt lawsuits that are
not in the corporation's interests, should also be afforded to the board
in a removal action. An unfounded statutory rule that deprives the
board of such authority when a suit is brought by a shareholder
holding an arbitrary number of shares should be eliminated.
Certainly, such a board determination could be deemed unnecessary
or overruled on similar grounds as in derivative actions, for example
when a majority of the directors adopting the decision was interested.
If a removal lawsuit has not been halted by board action, the
proposed test proceeds with a three-prong analysis. First, the court
not inflict the same harm upon the interests of the corporation. Certainly, other
established removal remedies outside the corporate law context could address directorial
misbehavior that adversely impacts areas of public policy concern (e.g., those related to
the environment, taxation or the securities markets). Thus, a removal remedy designed to
address wrongdoing against a corporation should not be modified to harm the corporation
in pursuit of deterrence.
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should consider whether an actionable wrong has been committed by
the director. Second, the court should determine whether removing
the director will be in the best interests of the corporation, which
means adhering to the determination of the board, if available and
not wrongful. Third, the court should ask whether an instance of
procedural or divergence of interests impairment to shareholder
voting exists. If all three criteria are met, then the misbehaving
director may be removed, unless the court, in its discretion, finds that
other considerations, such as the objective of preserving the present
balance of powers within a corporation, are sufficiently compelling to
justify retaining the director. The finding of a particular type of
impairment to shareholder voting should also affect the scope of the
remedy: a bar on reelecting directors may be justified when the
impairment stems from divergence of interests, but not when it is
merely procedural. The proposed test could be codified in the
corporate statutes or introduced directly by courts.
Remedies help some and hurt others. The removal remedy can
be sweeping in its application and hurt unintentionally by taking away
from everyone. From shareholders, their inherent rights. From
boards of directors, their inherent authority. From corporations, their
directors. From directors, their jobs. Under the approach proposed
in this article, the removal remedy will grant relief, but hurt less.
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